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1. 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008) (mem.).  The Supreme Court simultaneously declined to review
another case involving the same issue on the scope of ERISA’s remedial relief in Goeres v.
Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2994 (2008) (mem.).  Mr. Goeres was the beneficiary
of a decedent participant’s ERISA-covered retirement plan.  Goeres v. Charles Schwab & Co.,
Inc., No. C 04-01917 CRB, 2004 WL 2203474, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2004), aff’d, 220 F.
App’x 663 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2994 (2008) (mem.).  Mr. Goeres alleged
that the plan fiduciary repeatedly and incorrectly advised him that he was not the beneficiary.
Id.  Between the time that Mr. Goeres began seeking control of the plan and the time that the
fiduciary acknowledged that he was the beneficiary, the value of the plan had dropped from $1.2
million to $565,000.  Id.
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §§ 2-4096, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1369
(2000).
3. Brief for The United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Amschwand v.
Spherion Corp., 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008) (No. 07-841), 2008 WL 2185730, at *2 [hereinafter
DOL Amschwand Brief].
4. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 132, ERISA § 502.  Rather than parallel citing to both the
United States Code and the ERISA code section, this Article will follow the less cumbersome
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In June 2008, the Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in
the case of Amschwand v. Spherion Corp.   Amschwand involved a recurring1
remedial issue under ERISA —whether a participant or beneficiary in an2
employee welfare benefit plan is entitled to individualized monetary relief for
losses caused by a fiduciary breach.   The controversy stems from ERISA’s3
detailed remedial scheme, which requires participants and beneficiaries to
squeeze their request for relief into one of the statutorily defined categories.4
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convention of citing only to the ERISA code section.
5. ERISA § 502(a)(3).
6. See infra Part II.  ERISA fiduciaries are subject to strict duties of prudence and loyalty,
and participants and beneficiaries aggrieved by a fiduciary’s breach of such duties may sue for
redress under ERISA’s “carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme.”  Mertens v. Hewitt
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254 (1993) (noting that ERISA’s “carefully crafted and detailed
enforcement scheme provides ‘strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other
remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.’”) (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 413 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1985)).  Spherion, the defendant in the Amschwand case, likely
breached its fiduciary duty by communicating false and misleading information to Mr.
Amschwand, thereby violating ERISA.  See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996).
The Variety Court explained that ERISA section 404(a) requires a fiduciary to
“discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries.”  To participate knowingly and significantly in deceiving a
plan’s beneficiaries in order to save the employer money at the beneficiaries’
expense, is not to act “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.”
Id. (quoting ERISA § 404(a)).  The Court further recognized the participant’s right to sue a
fiduciary under ERISA section 502(a)(3) for the harm to the individual, as opposed to harm to
the plan, for such a breach.  Id.
7. Prior to the 1930s, state and federal court systems in the United States were divided into
separate law and equity courts, following the English tradition.  Law and equity courts had
different jurisdictions, with different procedures and remedies, with trust law cases typically
falling within the jurisdiction of equity courts.  See 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 158, at 214 (5th. ed. Belknap 1941).  The states merged law and equity courts
at varying times, but in the federal system, law and equity courts were merged by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.  The terms “divided bench” and “pre-fusion” used herein refer
to the separate system of law and equity courts before the two systems were joined.       
8. Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 365 (2006); Great-West Life &
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002); Mertens, 508 U.S. at 254; see
discussion infra Part III.A.
9. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217 (distinguishing between legal and equitable forms of
restitution by reference to the “standard current works such as Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the
Participants and beneficiaries like the plaintiff in Amschwand are relegated to
obtaining only “appropriate equitable relief” under ERISA section 502(a)(3),5
which the Supreme Court has interpreted so narrowly as to effectively
preclude relief in many instances where a fiduciary breach has clearly caused
a loss.6
To determine whether the relief sought constitutes “equitable relief” within
the meaning of section 502(a)(3), the Supreme Court has ruled that courts
must examine the historical practice of the equity courts in the days of the
divided bench  and look to whether the relief was “typically available” as an7
equitable remedy for the type of fiduciary breach at issue.   The Supreme8
Court optimistically observed that courts unfamiliar with the distinctions
between legal and equitable relief need look no further than the “standard
current works” for guidance.   Those concerned that such an inquiry might be9
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss4/2
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Restatements.”)  
10. Id. (Scalia, J., responding to Justice Ginsburg’s criticism that the majority’s analysis
requires an “antiquarian inquiry” into what court would have entertained the fiduciary claim in
the days of the divided bench).  
11. Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., No. H-02-4836, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21007, at **16-
17 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2005), aff’d, 505 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2995
(2008).  The district court subsequently granted summary judgment to Mrs. Amschwand on her
claim for an award of statutory penalties and attorneys’ fees for Spherion’s failure to provide
requested plan documents, a violation of ERISA sections 502(c)(1)(B) and (g)(1).  Amschwand
v. Spherion Corp., No. H-02-4836, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12247 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2006).
Although Mrs. Amschwand sued individually and on behalf of the estate of Thomas
Amschwand, for the sake of brevity, this Article will refer to Mrs. Amschwand individually.
Similarly, although Mrs. Amschwand sued Spherion Corporation, the Trustees of the Interim
Health Benefits Trust, and the Group Life and Accidental Dismemberment Insurance Plan, this
Article collectively refers to the Amschwand defendants as “Spherion.”
“antiquarian” can feel reassured that the “standard current works” will
nevertheless “make the answer clear.”10
The Department of Labor has consistently taken the position that monetary
relief is available under ERISA section 502(a)(3) because “equitable relief”
encompasses a form of relief available under traditional trust law—make-
whole relief.  This Article seeks to assess both the arguments in favor of the
Department of Labor’s position and the counter arguments, and attempts to
reconcile the competing views of make-whole relief by revisiting the common
law of trusts as articulated in the “standard current works” and as formulated
by case law.  The Article first concludes that make-whole relief was a form of
equitable relief that was traditionally available in trust law for breaches of
trust.  The counter arguments that such relief was limited to cases where the
trust corpus was harmed, and that any recovery must be paid into the trust
corpus, have some support in the cases, but ultimately are irrelevant in the
context of modern-day ERISA welfare benefit plans.  The Article recognizes,
however, that these counter arguments gained traction because the make-
whole remedy was designed to provide redress in traditional trust situations
and is simply a bad fit for modern employee welfare benefit plans.  In
conclusion, ERISA section 502(a)(3) does support the availability of make-
whole relief, but make-whole relief is a square peg in a round hole.
The Amschwand case provides a unifying theme for this Article because it
squarely addressed the central issue of make-whole relief and produced
perhaps the most refined articulations to date of the arguments and counter
arguments against such relief under current Supreme Court precedent.  The
district court dismissed Mrs. Amschwand’s claim on the basis that her
requested monetary relief against the breaching fiduciary was a form of legal
relief (damages) unavailable under ERISA’s narrow remedial scheme.   But,11
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12. ERISA § 514(a).     
13. John R. Kirk & Marguerite J. Slagle, ERISA Preemption: A Survey of the Kentucky
Courts’ Interpretation of the Sixth Circuit’s Preemption Analysis, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 575, 577-
79 (2007) (summarizing Supreme Court preemption decisions).
14. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456-57 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J.,
concurring)).
15. Allinder v. Inter-City Prods. Corp. (USA), 152 F.3d 544, 553 (6th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1178 (1999) (mem.) (noting the “betrayal without a remedy” left by the
Mertens decision).
16. The Supreme Court, 2003 Term - Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 456, 461 (2004)
(reviewing Davila, 542 U.S. 200).
17. Colleen E. Medill, Resolving the Judicial Paradox of “Equitable” Relief Under ERISA
Section 502(a)(3), 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 827 passim (2006) (describing how the judicially
created paradox of “equitable” relief under section 502(a)(3) operates in a variety of contexts,
including breach of fiduciary duty cases but extending to other types of claims brought under
section 502(a)(3)).  
18. Paul Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of ERISA, 61
HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2009). 
19. Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 453
(Becker, J., concurring)); see also Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi,
J., dissenting in part) (stating that the Supreme Court should “start over” in its analysis of the
availability of consequential damages under ERISA), vacated, 542 U.S. 933 (2004); Shannon
P. Duffy, Becker Calls on Congress, Justices to Fix ERISA, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct.
16, 2003, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005536910 (noting that Judge Becker sent
his opinion to the committee chairs, ranking members, chief majority counsel, and the minority
counsel of both the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions and the House
if a participant or beneficiary’s requested relief does not squarely fall within
ERISA’s prescribed categories of relief, she has no relief at all.  Any state law
claims that Mrs. Amschwand might otherwise assert against the breaching
fiduciary are foreclosed by ERISA’s preemption provision, which provides
that Title I and Title II of ERISA “supersede any and all State laws” so far as
the State laws “relate to any employee benefit plan.”12  ERISA’s preemption
provision has been broadly interpreted by the Supreme Court, ostensibly to
carry out the congressional objective of national uniformity for laws
governing employee benefits programs.13
The problem created by the Court’s broad interpretation of the preemption
provision, coupled with its narrow interpretation of equitable relief under
ERISA section 502(a)(3) using the law-equity distinction, has been variously
described as a “vacuum,”  “betrayal without a remedy,”  a “gaping hole,”14 15 16
a “judicial paradox”  and a problem of “intersectionality.”   Not surprisingly,17 18
the existence of a cognizable injury without any remedy has led to a “rising
judicial chorus urging that Congress and [the Supreme] Court revisit what is
an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime.”19
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss4/2
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Committee on Education and the Workforce).  For a collection of judicial and scholarly
authorities voicing this concern, see Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 489 F.3d 590, 593-94 (3d Cir.
2007) (Ambro, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
20. Davila, 542 U.S. at 223 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
21. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means By “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s
Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003)
[hereinafter Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”]; Medill, supra note 17, at 830; see
also Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Closing the Gap: Safeguarding Participants’ Rights by
Expanding the Federal Common Law of ERISA, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 671, 713 (1994).  In addition
to expanded use of federal common law, Professor Zanglein proposed that Congress “must
exempt from ERISA’s preemption provision unfair claims practices regulated by state insurance
law, tort claims of fraudulent misrepresentation, and tort claims of negligence relating to the
administration of an employee benefit plan.”  Id. at 722.  
22. Justice Ginsburg suggested that make-whole relief might be an appropriate form of
relief traditionally available in trust law in her concurring opinion in Davila.  542 U.S. at 222
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
23. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note 21.  Professor Langbein
traced the Supreme Court’s decisions that interpreted the remedies available under ERISA
section 502(a)(3), limiting relief to equitable remedies such as injunction, mandamus, and
restitution.  Id.  Professor Langbein explained why the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this
area has been mistaken—for example, mandamus was not even an equitable remedy.  Id. at
1353.
24. The Secretary of Labor is charged with interpreting and enforcing the provisions of
Title I of ERISA.  See infra note 150 for a partial listing of Department of Labor briefs.
Professor Medill has traced the Department’s position beginning with Mertens.  Medill, supra
note 17, at 832-33. 
25. See Medill, supra note 17.
Specifically, Justice Ginsburg has called for the Court’s “fresh
consideration of the availability of consequential damages under § 502(a)(3)”
by reference to traditional trust law remedies.   Commentators and litigants20
have likewise attempted to fill this remedial gap by reference to equitable
remedies available under the common law of trusts and trustees.   One such21
remedy that the equity courts historically awarded to redress a breach of
fiduciary duty was to put the trust beneficiary in the position she would have
been in were if not for the breach—this is referred to as the “make-whole
doctrine.”22
The argument that section 502(a)(3) equitable relief includes make-whole
relief is not novel, having been propounded by leading trust scholar Professor
Langbein,  and advocated by the Department of Labor for many years.23 24
Further, Professor Medill has cogently and comprehensively presented the
theoretical case for the Department of Labor’s litigation position.25
Conversely, plan fiduciaries have forcefully made their case, arguing that
make-whole relief, to the extent that it was available under traditional trust
law principles, was only available for fiduciary breaches that harmed the trust
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
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26. Brief In Opposition, Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008) (No. 07-
841), 2008 WL 261212, at *10 [hereinafter Amschwand Opp. Cert.].  The first argument was
not novel, apparently having been developed in the Enron litigation.  See Reply on Behalf of
Certain Administrative Committee Defendants to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Their Motion to
Dismiss ERISA Claims, Tittle v. Enron Corp., (No. H 01-3913), 2002 WL 32155515 (S.D. Tex.
June 24, 2002) [hereinafter Fiduciaries’ Enron Brief].  The second argument appears to have
been developed, or at least to have reached its clearest articulation, in the Amschwand/Goeres
litigation.  
27. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217 (2002) (instructing
courts to look to “standard current works” when determining what equitable remedies were
available under ERISA section 502(a)(3)).   
corpus, and that any monetary recovery went to the trust corpus, not to the
individual beneficiary.   These arguments gained traction because pre-fusion26
breach of trust cases are not a direct analogue to the breaches of fiduciary duty
that occur in the context of today’s employee welfare benefit plans.  Pre-
fusion fiduciary breaches typically involved maladministration of a trust
corpus, whereas, because ERISA welfare benefit plans are typically not
funded through a trust, there is no trust corpus.  The most comparable pre-
fusion cases involve trustee breaches of promises to pay money to a
beneficiary, but again, these payments were typically paid from the trust
corpus.  This lack of a direct analogue is the apparent source of the counter
arguments against application of the make-whole doctrine to section
502(a)(3).
These counter arguments have not been thoroughly evaluated in the
scholarly literature to date.  Building on the work of Professors Langbein,
Medill, and others who have placed the concept of make-whole relief on the
agenda, this Article seeks to assess both the arguments in favor of the
Department of Labor’s litigation position and the counter arguments.  The
goal is modest—to attempt to reconcile the competing views of make-whole
relief described above by revisiting make-whole relief under the common law
of trusts as articulated in the “standard current works”  and pre-fusion trust27
law cases.  
Part I provides an overview of the Amschwand case, which frames the
litigation posture in this sub-set of breach of duty to inform cases.  Part II
reviews the pertinent provisions of ERISA’s regulatory scheme.  Part III
summarizes the major Supreme Court decisions that forced ERISA
commentators and litigants into the pre-fusion trust world and examines how
make-whole relief fits into this emerging jurisprudence.  Parts IV and V line
up the arguments for and against the availability of make-whole relief under
ERISA section 502(a)(3) and analyze the viability of these competing views
by digging more deeply into traditional trust law using the only tools
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss4/2
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28. The breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty at issue in Amschwand was a
misrepresentation and/or failure to inform the plan participant of plan eligibility or plan terms,
which resulted in a total loss of benefits, referred to hereinafter as “Amschwand-type cases.”
Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., No. H-02-4836, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21007, at **16-17
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2005), aff’d, 505 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2995
(2008).  Because the focus of this Article is the trust law basis for make-whole relief in the type
of situation presented by the Amschwand case, it does not seek to categorize the universe of
cases where such relief might also be “appropriate.”  See ERISA § 502(a)(3) (providing for
“other appropriate equitable relief”) (emphasis added).  For a comprehensive analysis of the
categories of cases where make-whole relief might be appropriate, refer to Professor Medill’s
work in this area.  See generally Medill, supra note 17.  It bears noting that neither the
Department of Labor nor their protagonists appear to take the position that their arguments for
or against the availability of make-whole relief are limited to the duty to inform context.
29. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., No. 07-841 (Dec. 21,
2007), 2007 WL 4618420, at *2, cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008) [hereinafter Amschwand
Cert. Petition].
available, the major trust law treatises and pre-fusion trust law cases that
addressed individualized remedies for analogous fiduciary breaches.  
The Article first concludes that equity courts recognized two types of make-
whole relief, one of which contemplated recovery to the trust and is echoed
in ERISA section 502(a)(2) and one which contemplated recovery to the
aggrieved beneficiary and is echoed in ERISA section 502(a)(3).  The Article
also concludes with the argument that make-whole relief’s required harm to
the trust corpus is irrelevant.  The traditional trust law corpus finds its
analogue in the present day employee welfare benefit plan context in the
promised benefit, such as Mr. Amschwand’s life insurance proceeds.  Thus,
to the extent that harm to the corpus is required, such harm exists in the loss
or depreciation of the benefit.  And, in any event, make-whole relief in the
traditional trust law context was available even where there was no trust
corpus, usually because it had ceased to exist, or there was no harm to the trust
corpus itself.
This Article concludes, therefore, that make-whole relief was an equitable
remedy available to individual beneficiaries to redress breaches of fiduciary
duty, even in the absence of harm to the trust corpus.  Under the Supreme
Court’s precedents, such relief should be available to Mrs. Amschwand.28
I. The Unifying Theme: The Amschwand Case
Mr. Amschwand was employed by Spherion Corporation and participated
in a life insurance employee benefit plan offered by Spherion through
Prudential.   While Mr. Amschwand was on medical leave, Spherion replaced29
Prudential with Aetna as its life insurance provider under the employee
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
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30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at *3.
33. Id. at *2.
34. Id. at *2-3.  As explained, infra Part II.D., because of ERISA’s detailed and exclusive
remedial scheme, Mrs. Amschwand’s only available remedial option was ERISA section
502(a)(3).
35. Id. at *1, 3.
36. Id. at *3.
37. See generally Medill, supra note 17, at 896-904.  Professor Medill conducts a modeling
exercise adapted from the Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed modeling technique to
identify six categories of defendants and related claims possible under section 502(a)(3).  Id. at
867, 884 (citing Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1989 (1972)).  Professor Medill
categorizes breach of fiduciary duty claims as “Category III” claims, with claims involving a
breach of the duty to inform as a sub-set of Category III claims.  Medill, supra note 17, at 899.
welfare benefit plan.   Aetna’s insurance policy had an “Active Work Rule”30
that provided that if an employee was ill, injured, or absent on the date that his
coverage would become effective, effective coverage would not begin until
that employee returned to work for one full day.31
When Mr. Amschwand died, Aetna denied life insurance coverage to his
widow because he had failed to comply with the Active Work Rule during his
medical leave.   During his leave, however, Mr. Amschwand had contacted32
Spherion in its capacity as plan administrator and a named plan fiduciary, and
was repeatedly assured that he was covered under the new Aetna plan and that
he was entitled to the same benefits as under the Prudential plan.   Spherion33
never told Mr. Amschwand about the Active Work Rule and failed to provide
him with plan documents that would have put him on notice of the rule,
despite his repeated requests.34
Mrs. Amschwand sued Spherion, the plan, and the plan trustees under
ERISA section 502(a)(3) seeking the life insurance benefits that she had lost.35
She claimed that defendants breached their fiduciary duty by failing to tell Mr.
Amschwand about the Active Work Rule, by failing to give him the
documents that would have put him on notice of the rule, and by making
affirmative misrepresentations that he was covered under the Aetna plan.36
Mrs. Amschwand’s claim is typical of that group of plaintiffs falling into
the “regulatory vacuum” described in the Introduction.  Other illustrative
examples abound.   These hapless plaintiffs are referred to in the remainder37
of this Article as Amschwand-type plaintiffs, for no other reason than the
Amschwand case provides an excellent—and timely—vehicle for
consideration of whether make-whole relief is available to fill the gaping hole
in ERISA’s regulatory scheme caused by the interplay of the restrictive civil
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss4/2
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38. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980) (describing
ERISA as a “comprehensive and reticulated statute”); LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs.,
Inc., 128 S. Ct 1020, 1027 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (same, quoting Mass. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. V. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)); see also  Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841
(1997) (“ERISA is an intricate, comprehensive statute.”).
39. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 841.
40. ERISA §§ 101-11, 401-14.  Pension plans are also subject to complex participation,
vesting, and funding requirements.  See id. §§ 201-06.
41. Id. § 502.
42. For a full discussion of ERISA, see generally PAUL J. SCHNEIDER & BARBARA W.
FREEDMAN, ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE § 3.02 (2d. ed. 2003). 
43. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
44. ERISA § 3(a)(3).
45. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 839 (1997) (holding that ERISA preempted state
community property law).
46. Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer’s Shield: The Perversity of ERISA
Fiduciary Law, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 398, nn.59, 60 (2000) [hereinafter Muir,
Fiduciary Status] (citing to legislative history).
enforcement scheme and the broad preemption provision.  It is to those
pertinent parts of ERISA that this Article now turns, before returning in more
detail to Mrs. Amschwand’s claims.
II.  ERISA’s Regulatory Scheme and Remedial Relief
ERISA is oft-described as a “comprehensive and reticulated statute.”   Its38
regulatory scheme governs employee benefit plans, which include both
pension and welfare plans.   Both pension plans and employee welfare benefit39
plans must conform to ERISA’s reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary
requirements,  and ERISA provides a detailed, but narrow, civil enforcement40
scheme for violations of the statutory requirements.   Rather than attempt to41
comprehensively set forth all of ERISA’s statutory goals, provisions, and
relevant implementing regulations, for present purposes a brief summary
should suffice.42
A. ERISA’s Purpose
Enacted in 1974, ERISA’s primary aim was to protect individuals who
participate in employee benefit plans.   Congress noted that these plans affect43
the “well-being and security of millions of employees . . . and their
dependents”  and are central to “the national economy, and . . . the financial44
security of the Nation’s work force.”   Congress was particularly focused on45
pension plan assets.   Pension plans usually have large assets which had been46
subject to abuse prior to the enactment of ERISA.  Workers who had relied
upon their employer’s pension promises often found themselves without their
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
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47. Id. at 398.  An oft-cited precipitant for ERISA was the closing of the Studebaker plant
and the termination of its underfunded pension plan.  See id. at 401; see also James A. Wooten,
“The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: The Studebaker-Packard Corporation
and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 726 (2001). 
48. Muir, Fiduciary Status, supra note 46, at 399-400.
49. ERISA §§ 301-08. 
50. Muir, Fiduciary Status, supra note 46, at 400-01.  Professor Muir discusses other
ERISA provisions designed to address the problem of plan termination, asset depletion, and
other pension plan asset abuses.  See generally id. at 400-04 (discussing “[o]pportunistic
[b]ehavior and [a]sset [a]dministration”).  Professor Muir argues that commentators, courts, and
legislators should unpack benefit plan operation into its two “axes,” one made up of plan assets
and the other made up of the payment of benefits.  Id. at 399.  By separating plan operation into
these two different components, plan administration could be more effective.  Id.  Although an
analysis of the distinctions between plan asset and benefit administration is beyond the scope
of this Article, the distinction is significant when considering the effectiveness of the current
ERISA remedial scheme, in that it fails to adequately protect participants and beneficiaries from
fiduciary breaches in benefit administration of the type the Amschwands experienced.  Further,
this distinction between plan asset administration and the provision of plan benefits comes into
play when attempting to draw out the conditions under which traditional trust law make-whole
relief was available and whether these conditions are met for ERISA section 502(a)(3) plaintiffs.
Specifically, as discussed infra Part IV, the lack of a trust and/or trust assets in the types of
benefit plans that are prevalent today has led to the argument that traditional make-whole relief
is not available under ERISA.
51. Muir, Fiduciary Status, supra note 46, at 404.
52. Id. (noting that health care plans received almost no attention beyond investigation into
malfeasance and self-dealing).
53. ERISA § 404.
54. Id. §§ 101-111.
55. Id. §§ 409, 502.
promised retirement income because the plan was terminated  or because47
assets were mismanaged by poor investments, wasting, or even fraud.48
ERISA addressed these concerns with asset funding in several ways, such as
imposing minimum funding requirements,  establishing the Pension Benefit49
Guaranty Corporation to insure the obligations of pension plans,  and50
requiring that plan assets be held in trust.51
In contrast to congressional concern over underfunding and
mismanagement of pension plan assets, Congress paid less attention to
problems of benefit administration involved in pension benefits or other forms
of employee welfare benefits such as health care plans.   That is not to52
suggest that Congress did not address issues of benefit administration; on the
contrary, Congress established several mechanisms to ensure administrative
fairness.  These included the adoption of strict fiduciary standards of
conduct,  reporting and disclosure requirements,  and fiduciary liability for53 54
breach of these standards,  discussed more fully in Part II.C.55
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56. This reference to the “ERISA landscape” is borrowed from Justice Stevens’ opinion in
LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1024-25 (2008).
57. A defined contribution plan provides an individual account for each employee’s
contributions, but usually provides no promise of a monthly pension benefit amount; the benefit
is based on the amount in the participant’s account.  A 401(k) plan is a defined contribution
plan.  A defined benefit plan typically pays a fixed benefit based on a percentage of the
employee’s salary.  See generally Russell v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482, 486 (9th
Cir. 1983) (describing defined benefit plans).  For an explanation of the difference between
defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans, see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525
U.S. 432 (1999).  
58. See LaRue 128 S. Ct. at 1025 (citing, inter alia, David Rajnes, An Evolving Pension
System: Trends in Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans, Employee Benefit Research
Institute (EBRI) Issue Brief No. 249 (Sept. 2002), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0902ib.pdf;
Facts from EBRI:  Retirement Trends in the United States Over the Past Quarter-Century (June
2007), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0607fact.pdf).
59. See generally Muir, Fiduciary Status, supra note 46.  The Supreme Court recently
acknowledged one such change in the employee benefit plan “landscape” since 1974,
highlighting the decline of defined benefit plans and their replacement with defined contribution
plans.  LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1024-25 (citing, inter alia, JOHN H. LANGBEIN, SUSAN J. STABILE,
& BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 58 (4th ed. 2006)); see also Edward
A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 471 (2004). 
60. See generally Muir, Fiduciary Status, supra note 46.
61. ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B).
Nevertheless, Congress was largely driven by underfunding and
maladministration of pension plan assets and less concerned, although
certainly cognizant of, benefit plan administration.  Since 1974, there have
been significant changes in the ERISA landscape  which have resulted in the56
“intersectionality” problem that has taken center stage today.  First, employers
have largely replaced defined benefit plans with defined contribution plans.57
Second, health and fringe benefits have replaced pensions as the most
significant benefit for present-day employees.   Because congressional focus58
when enacting ERISA in 1974 was on asset administration, not benefit
administration, ERISA’s 1974 iteration of remedies is not necessarily suitable
for today’s landscape.59
The growth of health and fringe benefits and their replacement of
traditional pension plans as a significant component of employee
compensation results in disputes over benefit administration becoming more
prevalent today than they were in 1974.   While a simple wrongful denial of60
benefits can be remedied through ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), a participant
who is ineligible for benefits because of a fiduciary misrepresentation or other
fiduciary breach is compelled to seek relief under section 502(a)(3)—the
catch-all provision for “other appropriate equitable relief.”61
The regulatory vacuum referred to in the Introduction to this Article occurs
when a participant is injured by a fiduciary breach that cannot be remedied
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62. 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2006).
63. The entity establishing and maintaining the plan (ERISA § 3(1)(A)) is called the plan
“sponsor” (ERISA § 3(16)(B)), or the “settler” of the plan, following the traditional trust law
term for the person establishing and funding the trust corpus.
64. ERISA § 3(1)(A).
65. Id. §3(2)(A).
under any other applicable remedial provision, but the court finds that section
502(a)(3) does not provide for the requested relief.  When this occurs, the
participant is barred from asserting applicable state law claims by ERISA’s
preemption provision.  This gaping hole in ERISA’s remedial scheme needs
to be filled, and this is the hole that commentators and the Department of
Labor have attempted to fill with the common law doctrine of make-whole
remedial relief.
B. Some ERISA Basics
Although most readers will likely be familiar with ERISA, an ERISA
primer is likely required for any brave souls dipping their toes into ERISA’s
regulatory regime for the first time.  Articulated simply, ERISA governs
employee pension plans, including 401(k) plans  and employee welfare62
benefit plans such as health care coverage and life insurance.  An employee
welfare benefit plan means “any plan, fund, or program” typically established
and funded by an employer,  to provide certain benefits, such as:63
medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the
event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or
vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day
care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services.64
Welfare plans may be self-funded by the employer or funded through the
purchase of insurance.  
An employee pension benefit plan is also a “plan, fund, or program,”
typically funded by the employer through a trust, that:
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a
deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the
termination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the
method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the
method of calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of
distributing benefits from the plan.65
As indicted by the definition of a pension plan, there are two types of
benefit plans.  First, under a defined benefit plan, a participant is entitled to
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66. Id. §3(35); Muir, Fiduciary Status, supra note 46, at 404-05.
67. ERISA § 3(34); Muir, Fiduciary Status, supra note 46, at 404-05.
68. See ERISA § 3(21)(A).  An ERISA fiduciary, therefore, includes persons who might
not be considered trustees under traditional trust law, which defines a trustee as “[t]he person
holding property in trust.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 3(3) (1959). 
69. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995).  The Court explained
that “ERISA does not create any substantive entitlement to employer-provided health benefits
or any other kind of welfare benefits.  Employers or other plan sponsors are generally free under
ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans.”  Id. (citations
omitted).  Nor does ERISA establish any minimum participation, vesting, or funding
requirements for welfare plans as it does for pension plans.  See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1983).
70. ERISA § 3(7).  A plan participant may include a former employee with a colorable
claim for benefits.  LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1026 n.6.
71. ERISA § 3(8).
72. As explained by Professor Dana M. Muir, most pension plan assets are held in trust, but
there is no need to establish a trust to fund most welfare benefit plans, such as health care plans,
because they are typically self-funded through the plan sponsor’s general funds or are insured
arrangements.  Muir, Fiduciary Status, supra note 46, at 395-96 (explaining the role of the
ERISA fiduciary and identifying the regulatory vacuum that has led to the perverse result that
courts do not hold ERISA fiduciaries liable for breach of their duties under current judicial
interpretation of section 502(a)).
73. ERISA § 403(a).
74. Id. § 403(b).
benefits as calculated using the formula specified in the plan.   This is the66
traditional pension plan arrangement where the sponsor pays a specified
amount in retirement benefits.  Second, under a defined contribution plan,
each participant is entitled to the amount in that participant’s plan account,
such as a 401(k) plan.67
A “fiduciary” under ERISA is any person that has discretion over
the assets, management, or administration of a benefit plan.   An employer68
may be both the sponsor of the plan (the “settlor” in trust terminology) and a
fiduciary, but only wears the fiduciary hat when exercising discretionary
authority over the plan.   A plan “participant” means any employee or former69
employee “who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type
from an employee benefit plan.”   A “beneficiary” means a person designated70
by either the participant or the terms of the plan “who is or may become
entitled to a benefit” under the plan.71
As noted, plans can be self-funded or funded through an insured
arrangement.  Welfare benefit plans can be established through a trust
document but frequently are not.   Although ERISA provides that employee72
benefit plan assets must be held in trust,  there are important statutory73
exemptions, including assets that are funded through insurance policies.  74
Most welfare benefit plans are, however, administered through a trust account
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75. The author thanks Professor John Langbein for this insight. 
76. Muir, Fiduciary Status, supra note 46, at 395.  
77. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S.
316, 326-27 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Massachusetts v. Morash, 490
U.S. 107, 115 (1989)); see also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. V. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 141 n.8
(1985) (referring to ERISA’s legislative history that “the crucible of congressional concern [in
sections 409 and 502(a)(2)] was misuse and mismanagement of plan assets by plan
administrators.”).
78. ERISA § 2(b).
79. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570
(1985).  As the legislative history makes clear, “[t]he fiduciary responsibility section, in essence,
codifies and makes applicable to these fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution
of the law of trusts.”  H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 4649. 
80. An early English articulation of the extent of the trustee’s duty of care can be found in
Learoyd & Carter v. Whitely [1887] UKHL 1, 12 App. Cas. 727 (Ch. D. 1886) (appeal taken
from Eng.) (U.K.) (“As a general rule the law requires of a trustee no higher degree of diligence
in the execution of his office than a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in the
management of his own private affairs.”).
established by the sponsor, from which the trustee pays the insurer or other
provider.   The absence of an identifiable trust res, or trust corpus, does not75
abrogate ERISA’s fiduciary standards or liability for fiduciary breach.
Regardless of whether the plan is funded through a trust or not, a person is
held to ERISA’s fiduciary standards and is subject to ERISA’s remedial
scheme if they have the requisite “discretion over the assets, management, or
administration of a benefit plan or are paid to provide investment advice to a
plan.”   As explained in Part V, because ERISA does not condition remedial76
relief on the presence of a trust and/or trust corpus, the absence of an
identifiable trust res therefore should not bar a participant’s recovery under
ERISA section 502(a)(3).
ERISA was primarily focused on deterring “the mismanagement of funds
accumulated to finance employee benefits and the failure to pay employees
benefits from accumulated funds.”   ERISA was concerned with protecting77
the interests of participants and beneficiaries from such mismanagement, and
in part achieved that goal by establishing standards of conduct for
fiduciaries.   In codifying the common law fiduciary standards, “Congress78
invoked the common law of trusts to define the general scope of [fiduciary]
authority and responsibility” under ERISA.   The duties of prudence and79
loyalty are based on trust law principles and are the central part of ERISA’s
fiduciary obligations.80
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81. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 472 U.S. at 570.
82. ERISA § 3(21)(A).  
83. See id. at 570-71; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170, 174 (1959).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 78 (2007); see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a) (amended 2004), 7C U.L.A. 588
(2006).  See generally 2A AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§
170–170.25 (4th ed 1987) (1939).
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. b.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227.
87. Id. § 183.  If, however, the trustee represents himself as having skills that meet a higher
standard, the trustee will be held to that higher standard.  Id. § 174.
C. Fiduciary Duties Under ERISA and Traditional Trust Law 
To effectuate the goals outlined above, Congress established “strict
standards” of conduct for employee benefit plan fiduciaries.   Indeed, ERISA81
expands fiduciary obligations and liability not just to trustees, but to all
persons who exercise the requisite discretion over the plan or its assets.   The82
fiduciary duty standard under ERISA is a high one, mirroring the general
duties of loyalty and trust established under the common law of trusts.   First,83
the common law fiduciary duty of loyalty, also known as the exclusive benefit
rule, requires that a trustee act “solely in the interest of the beneficiary.”84
The Restatement of Trusts explains:
The fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty in the trust context . . . is
particularly intense so that, in most circumstances, its prohibitions
are absolute for prophylactic reasons.  The rationale begins with a
recognition that it may be difficult for a trustee to resist temptation
when personal interests conflict with fiduciary duty.  In such
situations, for reasons peculiar to typical trust relationships, the
policy of the trust law is to prefer (as a matter of default law) to
remove altogether the occasions of temptation rather than to
monitor fiduciary behavior and attempt to uncover and punish
abuses when a trustee has actually succumbed to temptation.  This
policy of strict prohibition also provides a reasonable
circumstantial assurance (except as waived by the settlor or an
affected beneficiary) that beneficiaries will not be deprived of a
trustee’s disinterested and objective judgment.85
The fiduciary duty of prudence requires that, in investing trust assets, a
trustee must comport with the standard of a prudent investor.   While86
administering the trust, a trustee must act in accordance with a standard of
ordinary prudence.   The duties of loyalty and prudence are among the87
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88. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982).
89. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
90. ERISA § 404(a)(1).  Thus plan assets generally cannot “inure to the benefit of any
employer.”  Id. § 403(c)(1).
91. Id. § 404(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
92. Berlin v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1162 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Donovan,
680 F.2d at 271). 
93. ERISA § 406(b)(1).
94. See id. 
95. Id. § 404(a)(1)(B).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 (1959).
“highest known to the law.”   A well known and oft-quoted enunciation of the88
fiduciary standard was an opinion by Justice Cardozo:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties.  A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place.  Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of
an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.89
This strict common law standard was incorporated into ERISA’s fiduciary
standard, which mirrors traditional trust law as described above.  First, the
duty of loyalty requires that a fiduciary “discharge his duties with respect to
a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.”   Indeed,90
the plan fiduciary discharges his duties solely in the interests of the
participants and beneficiaries, “and . . . for the exclusive purpose of . . .
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and . . . defraying
reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”   Courts have explained that91
an ERISA plan administrator’s duty of loyalty requires that all decisions
regarding an ERISA plan “‘must be made with an eye single to the interests
of the participants and beneficiaries.’”   A fiduciary is also prohibited from92
engaging in self-dealing,  and from transacting with interested parties.93 94
ERISA similarly mirrors traditional trust law by utilizing the prudent man
standard.  ERISA requires that the plan fiduciary execute his duties “with the
care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing
that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use.”95
Under traditional trust law principles, a trustee must also furnish to the
beneficiary “complete and accurate information as to the nature and amount
of the trust property.”   Likewise, ERISA’s fiduciary administration functions96
encompass such activities as communicating plan terms and choices to plan
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97. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 502-03 (1996).
98. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(A)-(B).
99. Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., No. H-02-4836, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12247, at *10
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2006).
participants and beneficiaries.   This is the duty that is often implicated in97
section 502(a)(3) claims, such as the Amschwand situation.
Thus, ERISA has a broad remedial purpose of protecting participants and
beneficiaries from plan mismanagement.  To effectuate these goals, Congress
imported the strict fiduciary standards of trust law and extended fiduciary
duties to persons beyond the trustee.  In contrast to these broad remedial goals
and the use of trust law’s strict fiduciary standards, the Supreme Court has
adopted a textualist approach to the statute, interpreting it narrowly in the
context of providing relief to participants aggrieved by fiduciary breach.  This
tension between congressional purpose and Supreme Court interpretation is
illustrated by cases involving remedies of breaches of fiduciary duty under
ERISA section 502(a)(3).
D. ERISA’s Remedial Scheme and the “Gaping Hole”
As discussed throughout the earlier sections of this Article, ERISA’s
uniform regulatory scheme is a set of very specific civil enforcement remedies
for participants and beneficiaries, found in Part I of ERISA.  Specifically,
participants and beneficiaries are limited to bringing a civil action only for the
following types of relief in the following situations and for the specific relief
identified.  First, a participant or beneficiary may bring a civil action under
section 502(a)(1) if an Administrator refuses to supply certain information, “or
to recover benefits due . . . under the terms of [the] plan, [or] to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan.”   The available relief under section 502(a)(1)98
includes the benefits due and a statutory penalty for failure to provide
information—the most typical action under this section is a plan participant’s
appeal of a plan’s denial of benefits.
Amschwand-type plaintiffs cannot bring their claims under section
502(a)(1) because they are not complaining of a refusal to supply information
regarding the plan, nor are they able to claim benefits or enforce rights under
the plan, simply because they are ineligible for any benefits or rights under the
plan.  The fiduciary misrepresentation in Amschwand, for example, resulted
in Mr. Amschwand’s ineligibility under the terms of the new Aetna life
insurance policy, so he was never a participant in that plan and his wife was
never a beneficiary of that plan.   Similarly, although Mrs. Amschwand99
claimed that her husband had asked for, and had been refused, plan
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100. Id.  Mrs. Amschwand was successful on her separate claim for statutory penalties based
on Spherion’s failure to provide requested plan documents, including related attorneys’ fees and
costs.  Id.
101. ERISA § 502(a)(2).  It should be noted that the Secretary of Labor and plan fiduciaries
also have the power to bring a civil enforcement action under certain of these remedial
provisions, but since the focus of this Article is the relief available to participants and
beneficiaries for fiduciary breach, reference herein will be limited to this group of ERISA actors.
102. Id. § 409(a) (emphasis added).
103. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 252 (1993).
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting ERISA § 409(a)).
106. ERISA § 409(a).
107. 473 U.S. 134, 139-44 (1985).  The Court reasoned that allowing individual relief under
section 409(a) “would divorce [the catchall language] from its context and construct an entirely
documents, the relief for that violation is a per diem penalty which would not
provide the remedy she sought—the life insurance proceeds.100
Under section 502(a)(2), “a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary” may also
bring a civil action “for appropriate relief” under ERISA section 409.101
ERISA section 409(a) provides that any person who is a fiduciary to a plan
and violates an ERISA fiduciary duty
shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to
the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such
plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through
use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to
such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.  102
Reading section 409(a) in conjunction with section 502(a)(2), therefore,
allows a participant or beneficiary to bring a civil action against a fiduciary
and makes a fiduciary personally liable—but only for losses to the plan.103
The Mertens Court explained that under section 409(a), a fiduciary’s personal
liability has three components: (1) “[t]he fiduciary is personally liable for
damages” that result in plan losses, payable to the plan ; (2) the fiduciary is104
liable for restitution to the plan of “‘any profits of such fiduciary which have
been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary’”; and (3) “for
‘such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate,’
including removal of the fiduciary.”105
A fair reading of section 409 is that the third clause—allowing “other
equitable or remedial relief” —is a catch-all remedy potentially106
encompassing monetary damages to individual participants.  However, in
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, the Supreme Court held
that section 409(a) authorizes relief only for the benefit of the entire plan.107
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new class of relief available to entities other than the plan.”  Id. at 142 (emphasis omitted).
108. Id. at 144.  The Court has also termed these damages “consequential damages” and has
recently arguably narrowed the holding in Russell.  See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs.,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1022 (2008) (stating that Russell held “that a participant in a disability
plan that paid a fixed level of benefits could not bring suit under § 502(a)(2) . . . to recover
consequential damages arising from delay in the processing of her claim.”).  The plaintiff in
LaRue alleged that his employer failed to carry out his 401(k) plan investment instructions,
depleting his account by approximately $150,000.  Id.  The Court held “that although §
502(a)(2) does not provide a remedy for individual injuries distinct from plan injuries, [it] does
authorize recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant’s
individual [401(k) retirement savings plan] account.”  Id. at 1026.  LaRue distinguished between
a defined benefit plan like the plan at issue in Russell and a defined contribution plan, like the
401(k) plan at issue in LaRue.  Id. at 1024-25.  For a discussion of the distinctions between
these types of plans and the availability of individualized relief under section 502(a)(2), see
Justice Stevens’ cogent opinion, writing for the majority, in LaRue.  The plaintiff in LaRue also
sought make-whole relief under section 502(a)(2), but the Court did not reach the section
502(a)(3) issue.  Id. at 1023.  
109. ERISA § 502(a)(3).
110. Id.
The Court rejected any interpretation that the catchall remedy in section
409(a) permits courts to award what the Court termed “extracontractual
damages”  to participants individually.108
Amschwand-type plaintiffs, of course, are not seeking relief on behalf of the
plan and are not asking the fiduciary to make good to the plan any losses, or
to restore any profits.  It is clear that the Amschwand-type plaintiffs are
seeking to hold a fiduciary personally liable for individualized monetary
relief.  Hence, these plaintiffs cannot proceed under section 502(a)(2).
Congress recognized that plans and participants might not be able to shoe-
horn a claim into one of the specific remedies listed in sections 502(a)(1) or
(a)(2), and it provided a “catch-all” provision which provides injunctive and
equitable relief for plans and participants to enforce ERISA’s provisions “or
the terms of the plan.”   Specifically, section 502(a)(3) provides that a109
participant or beneficiary (or fiduciary) may bring a civil action: “(A) to
enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or
the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or
the terms of the plan.”   As discussed in Part II.D, this provision, section110
502(a)(3), may be the only avenue into federal court for Amschwand-type
plaintiffs and their only available remedy.  Indeed this was the provision under
which Mrs. Amschwand sought relief.  With the ERISA landscape as a
backdrop, it is to section 502(a)(3) that we finally turn our attention.
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111. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note 21.
112. 516 U.S. 489 (1996). 
113. Id. at 490.  In its decision, the Court pointed to the word “appropriate” as a limitation
on remedies available under section 502(a)(3) when it stated that if a plaintiff’s claim could be
brought under another, more specific provision of section 502 with a more limited remedy than
section 502(a)(3), the catch-all relief under the more generous section 502(a)(3) would not be
“appropriate.”  Id.
114. Id.
III. The Supreme Court’s Great-West Time Warp
A. Professor Langbein, the Supreme Court’s “Trail of Error” and the
Great-West Time Warp
As explained in Part II, ERISA’s enforcement scheme constrains
Amschwand-type plaintiffs to seek only “appropriate equitable relief” under
section 502(a)(3).  Because ERISA does not define what constitutes “equitable
relief,” the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that category of relief has
become pivotal.  Professor Langbein has explained why the Court’s
interpretation of section 502(a)(3) is erroneous, starting with the Mertens
decision and working through one of the Court’s more recent decisions,
Great-West.   Rather than replicating Professor Langbein’s article here, the111
reader is directed to review the article in its entirety.  Nevertheless, a brief
summary of the relevant Supreme Court decisions is necessary to orient the
reader to the gap that make-whole relief is argued to fill.
Although the Supreme Court had rejected in Russell the argument that
individualized relief for fiduciary breaches could be awarded under section
502(a)(2), the possibility that such relief might still be available under section
502(a)(3) remained open.  Russell was decided in 1985, and the Court did not
address this open question until several years later, in the 1996 decision of
Varity Corp. v. Howe.   To the dismay of plan attorneys and the delight of112
plaintiffs’ attorneys, the Varity Court held that section 502(a)(3) does indeed
allow participants and beneficiaries to sue for “appropriate equitable relief”
for breaches of fiduciary duty that cause them individual harm.   In Varity,113
the Court held that reinstatement back into a plan was “appropriate equitable
relief” for plan participants that had been misled into transferring out of the
plan and forfeited benefits as a result.114
The plaintiffs’ attorneys’ delight was tempered, however, by confusion over
what other types of “equitable relief” might be available as individualized
relief in the context of fiduciary breach claims.  In 1993, prior to Varity, the
Court had addressed the types of relief available under section 502(a)(3), but
in the context of relief against a non-fiduciary.  In Mertens v. Hewitt
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115. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
116. Id. at 255-56 (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim for monetary relief because it sought only
compensatory damages) .  Moreover, only “equitable restitution” may be awarded under section
502(a)(3), and not restitution “at law.”  Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534
U.S. 204, 215-16 (2002).  “[F]or restitution to lie in equity, the action generally must seek not
to impose personal liability on the defendant, but to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or
property in the defendant’s possession.”  Id. at 214.
117. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 248.
118. Id. at 250.
119. Id. at 253.  By its terms, section 504(a)(2) only applies to fiduciaries and the
accountant-defendants in Mertens were non-fiduciaries.  Id.
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 248. 
122. Id. at 266 (White, J., dissenting).  Justice White explained that compensatory damages
were available as an equitable remedy to a trust beneficiary because “[e]quity ‘endeavor[ed] as
far as possible to replace the parties in the same situation as they would have been in, if no
breach of trust had been committed.’”  Id. (quoting JAMES HILL, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE
LAW RELATING TO TRUSTEES, THEIR POWERS, DUTIES, PRIVILEGES, AND LIABILITIES *522 (4th
ed. T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1867) (1845) (* indicating pagination in original edition)).
According to Justice White, this included make-whole relief.  Id. at 273 n.7.
Associates,  the Court held that plaintiffs seeking relief under section115
502(a)(3) can only obtain “those categories of relief that were typically
available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not
compensatory damages).”   In Mertens, the plan participants sued a non-116
fiduciary actuary whom they alleged had knowingly participated in the
employer-fiduciary’s breach of duty.   The alleged fiduciary breach was the117
employer’s underfunding of the plan, resulting in monetary losses to the
plan.   The plaintiffs sought recovery of the plan losses from the actuary118
under section 502(a)(3) because they could not proceed under section
502(a)(2).119
The Court refused to classify the money sought against the actuary non-
fiduciary as “equitable relief” under section 502(a)(3), reasoning that the
participants did not seek a remedy “traditionally viewed as ‘equitable,’ such
as injunction or restitution” but were in fact seeking “nothing other than
compensatory damages—monetary relief for all losses their plan sustained as
a result of the alleged breach of fiduciary duties.  Money damages are, of
course, the classic form of legal relief.”   The Court highlighted120
congressional choice of only “equitable” remedies in section 502(a)(3) and
concluded that “equitable relief” must refer only to “those types of relief that
were typically available in equity.”   The plaintiffs, and Justice White in121
dissent, argued that since a court of equity could award monetary relief in a
breach of trust case brought in an equity court, then monetary relief was
similarly available in this case.   The Court, per Justice Scalia, rejected this122
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123. Id. at 256.  Professor Langbein has explained why Justice Scalia is wrong on this point.
This remark by Justice Scalia was an apparent reference to the clean-up doctrine, which has
nothing to do with equitable remedies.  Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra
note 21, at 1350.
124. 508 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added).
125. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214-17 (2002).
126. Id. at 205.
127. Id. at 212-14; accord Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 365 (2006).
128. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note 21, at 1350-51.
129. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 208-09.
argument, explaining that courts of equity sometimes granted purely legal
remedies, and the money damages sought from the defendant in Mertens was
just that—legal relief that would have been available in a court of equity under
the common law of trusts.123
Although the Mertens Court held that section 502(a)(3) relief is limited to
“those categories of relief that were typically available in equity,” it gave little
guidance on how to make this determination beyond listing the examples of
injunction, mandamus, and restitution.   The Court did not flesh out this124
analysis for almost a decade, until its decision in Great-West.
In Great-West, the Court reaffirmed the Mertens holding that ERISA’s
equitable relief is typically limited to that available in equity.  Explaining that
Congress could not have used the modifier “equitable” if it meant to allow all
relief a court could provide, the Court concluded that Congress must have
decided to revive the obsolete distinctions of law and equity in defining what
relief is available under ERISA.   The Supreme Court held that because125
money damages are not an equitable remedy, section 502(a)(3) does not
authorize suits by a plan to impose personal liability on a beneficiary based on
a breach of contractual obligation to pay money.126
The Supreme Court applied a two-prong test to determine whether section
502(a)(3) relief is available, examining both the nature of the cause of action
and the remedy sought.   The causes of action under ERISA section127
502(a)(3) are breaches of trust, which were typically brought in courts of
equity, but such claims could be also be brought in courts of law.   Hence,128
the focus of the debate has been the nature of the remedy sought under section
502(a)(3) claims.  
Unlike the Amschwand-type plaintiffs who are participants or beneficiaries
suffering a monetary loss due to a fiduciary breach, the Great-West plaintiff
was an ERISA fiduciary, a health insurance company, seeking reimbursement
of monies from a beneficiary under a health insurance contract.   The129
fiduciary-insurer sought relief under section 502(a)(3), seeking to enforce a
provision in the health insurance contract that obligated the beneficiary to
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130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 216-17.
133. This conclusion was forecast by Professor Dana M. Muir as early as 1995.  See Dana
M. Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1
(1995) (examining equitable relief under section 502(a)(3) after Mertens, correctly predicting
that courts would limit relief to equitable restitution, and calling for congressional amendments
modeled on the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
134. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210-13.
135. Id. at 216-17 (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 210.
reimburse Great-West from her third-party personal injury recovery for health
care payments Great-West had made on her behalf.   Great-West sought such130
relief as “equitable restitution.”131
Although the Mertens Court had listed restitution as a category of equitable
relief available under section 502(a)(3), Justice Scalia now explained that the
monies sought by Great-West were in fact a form of legal restitution and,
therefore, not available as “other equitable relief.”   In order to reach this132
somewhat strained conclusion,  the Court was required to enter a time warp133
and examine the historical practice in the “days of the divided bench” to see
when particular remedies were available at law and when at equity.134
Responding to Justice Ginsburg’s criticism of resurrecting the past, the Court
explained that to determine the availability of a remedy in equity, courts
should rely on standard treatises:
It is easy to disparage the law-equity dichotomy as an “ancient
classification” and an “obsolete distinctio[n].”  Like it or not,
however, that classification and distinction has been specified by
the statute; and there is no way to give the specification
meaning . . . except by adverting to the differences between law
and equity to which the statute refers.  The dissents greatly
exaggerate, moreover, the difficulty of that task. . . . Rarely will
there be need for any more “antiquarian inquiry,” than consulting,
as we have done, standard current works such as Dobbs, Palmer,
Corbin, and the Restatements, which make the answer clear.135
Reviewing these treatises to distinguish between money damages as the
classic form of legal relief and equitable restitution, which required that a
specific res be in the defendant’s hands, the Court concluded that the plan
impermissibly sought to impose personal liability for a contractual obligation
to pay money owed, and thus sought legal and not equitable relief.136
Professor Langbein has explained why the Court’s conclusion in Mertens
was erroneous, and how that decision has led to a “trail of error” up to and
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
744 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  61:721
137. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note 21.
138. Id.
139. Because the plan administrator and named fiduciary had repeatedly but incorrectly
assured Mr. Amschwand that he was covered under the plan, his widow had a cognizable claim
for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.  Amschwand Cert. Petition, supra note 29, at *2-3.
140. Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 505 F.3d 342, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 2995 (2008).
141. Id. at 348; Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., No. H-02-4836, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21007, at **20-21 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2005).  The Fifth Circuit incorrectly analyzed the make-
whole relief requested as restitution and summarily dismissed any meaningful distinction
between these two types of relief.  Amschwand, 505 F.3d at 347 (stating that “Amschwand seeks
relief—whether characterized as make-whole or restitutionary—that is legal in nature”).  As
previously discussed, make-whole relief is not the same as restitutionary relief and should not
be analyzed under the same standards.  See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
142. Amschwand, 505 F.3d at 347.
including the 2002 decision in Great-West.   Nevertheless, even within the137
narrow confines of these existing precedents, Professor Langbein presented
the argument for a form of monetary relief called make-whole relief that was
available in the courts of equity to redress breach of trust.138
B. Fitting Amschwand into ERISA’s Statutory Constraints—Mrs.
Amschwand’s Claim Falls Through the Gaping Hole
As explained in Part II.D, Mrs. Amschwand’s only available remedy under
ERISA would be for “other equitable relief” under ERISA section
502(a)(3).   The United States District Court for the Southern District of139
Texas granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed, holding that equitable relief under section 502(a)(3) does not
include make-whole relief equal to the insurance benefits that she would have
been entitled absent the alleged fiduciary breach.   In granting summary140
judgment, both the district and appellate courts held that the relief requested
constituted “money damages,” which were not available as “equitable
damages” under section 502(a)(3), as interpreted by the Court’s opinions in
Great-West.   Mrs. Amschwand’s attorney attempted to pull Mrs.141
Amschwand out of ERISA’s gaping hole by arguing that make-whole relief
is a form of equitable relief that was available under traditional trust law.142
It is to the make-whole doctrine that we now turn.
C. Fitting Make-Whole Relief Into the ERISA Framework and Supreme
Court Precedents—An Attempt to Fit a Square Peg into a Round Hole
Instead of Filling the Gaping Hole
Part II of this Article reviewed ERISA’s statutory framework, and identified
the “regulatory vacuum” whereby plaintiffs seeking monetary relief for a
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143. The author does not presuppose that Congress or the Supreme Court will fix the
problem any time soon.  Attempts to amend ERISA have so far fallen flat.  And, the Supreme
Court’s denial of the writ of certiorari in Amschwand indicates that the Court either thinks the
circuits are not split or that it has made its position clear in Great-West and Sereboff.  That being
the state of the law at the present time, courts, commentators, and litigants are all forced to
squeeze their square pegs into the round hole.   
144. See generally Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note 21, passim;
see also infra note 150.
145. Amended Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Opposing the Motions to
Dismiss at 51, In re Enron Corp., No. H-01-3913 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2002), 2002 WL
34236027 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a. (1959)) [hereinafter DOL
Enron Brief].  The author notes that she was previously Special Counsel with the law firm of
Steptoe & Johnson, LLP when the firm represented some of the defendants in the Enron ERISA
litigation. 
146. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 154, n.10 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“Trust-law remedies are equitable in nature, and include provision of monetary
damages.”) (citing GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 862 (2d ed. 1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 199, 205 (1959)).
147. Id. at 156-57 (Brennan, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 157-58 (Brennan, J., concurring). (delineating the court’s inquiry as, first,
ascertaining the extent to which state and federal law of trusts and pensions allows recovery
fiduciary breach are forced to assert their claims under ERISA section
502(a)(3).  Part III summarized the Supreme Court’s decisions that result in
plaintiffs like Mrs. Amschwand being limited to seeking only those types of
relief “typically available in equity,” looking to pre-fusion equity practice to
locate a suitable analogue.  Assuming that such an inquiry is necessary,  the143
Department of Labor and preeminent scholars such as Professor Langbein
have identified make-whole relief as a viable contender for the title of “relief
typically available in equity.”144
In its simplest iteration, make-whole relief is “monetary relief against
breaching fiduciaries [which] is equitable when it restores the beneficiary to
‘the position [in which] he would have been if the trustee had not committed
the breach of trust.’”   The idea that monetary relief might be available as145
“equitable relief” under section 502(a)(3) is not new.  Justice Brennan
identified the possibility in his concurring opinion in Russell.   Justice146
Brennan recognized that ERISA’s legislative history demonstrates that
“Congress intended to engraft trust-law principles onto the enforcement
scheme” and that “a fundamental concept of trust law is that courts ‘will give
to the beneficiaries of a trust such remedies as are necessary for the protection
of their interests.’”   Thus, Justice Brennan had no difficulty in concluding147
that ERISA explicitly directed the courts to develop appropriate remedies,
including the possibility of awarding extracontractual damages under section
502(a)(3).   Of course, Justice Scalia’s textualist approach in Mertens and148
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beyond the withheld benefit, second, if such a remedy is available under state law, considering
whether such relief would conflict with other ERISA provisions, and, third, including the
ultimate consideration of whether allowing the relief would effectuate ERISA’s underlying
purpose, “enforcement of strict fiduciary standards of care in the administration of all aspects
of pension plans and promotion of the best interests of participants and beneficiaries.”).  Justice
Brennan went so far as to state that the absence of monetary relief in state trust law was not
dispositive of the question whether monetary relief is available under ERISA because Congress
intended ERISA to have more “exacting” fiduciary standards.  Id. at 157 n.17 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted). 
149. ERISA § 502(a)(e).
150. See, e.g., DOL Enron Brief, supra note 145, at *51.  The Department has also filed
briefs in the Supreme Court wherein it takes the same make-whole position.  See, e.g., Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at *27 n.13, Aetna Health, Inc. v.
Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) (Nos. 02-1845, 03-83), 2003 WL 23011479 (ERISA may “allow[]
at least some forms of ‘make whole’ relief against a breaching fiduciary in light of the general
availability of such relief in equity at the time of the divided bench.”).  A listing of amicus briefs
that the Department deems significant can be found at the Department of Labor’s website.  U.S.
Dep’t of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, SOL Briefs, http://www.dol.gov/sol/media/briefs/
main.htm (last visited May 21, 2009).
151. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief of Respondents in Reply to Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at *1, Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., No. 07-841 (U.S. June 2, 2008), 2008 WL
2305819, cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008) [hereinafter Amschwand Respondents’ Supp.
Brief].  
152. Davila, 542 U.S. at 224 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
his resurrection of arcane pre-fusion inquiry in Great-West effectively side-
lined Justice Brennan’s suggested analysis.
From the government’s perspective, Justice Brennan had it right.  The
Department of Labor’s position is squarely in favor of the availability of
monetary relief under section 502(a)(3).  The Department of Labor is a crucial
voice on this issue because, although the majority of claims against breaching
fiduciaries are brought by private litigants, ERISA also authorizes the
Secretary of Labor to bring civil actions to redress violations of ERISA and
to obtain “appropriate equitable relief” under ERISA section 502(a)(3).149
Thus, it can be argued that the Court’s interpretation of what constitutes
“equitable relief” under section 502(a)(3) also impacts the Secretary’s
enforcement authority.  The Department of Labor has advocated the
availability of make-whole damages for several years as amicus curiae in
Amschwand-type cases.150
Although the Department of Labor’s position has been rejected by the
lower courts,  at least one Supreme Court Justice believes that it may be a151
viable theory of recovery.  In her concurring opinion in Davila, Justice
Ginsburg stated that the “Government’s suggestion may indicate an effective
remedy others similarly circumstanced might fruitfully pursue.”   152
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153. See Medill, supra note 17, at n.121 (cataloguing scholarly literature on ERISA section
502(a)(3)).  See also generally Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note 21.
Professor Langbein dissected the Supreme Court’s reasoning behind the Mertens holding that
Congress intended to resurrect the ancient law-equity dichotomy in section 502(a)(3), and
identified the sources of make-whole relief, ultimately endorsing the Department of Labor’s
position.  Langbein, “What ERISA Means by Equitable,” supra note 21, at nn. 110, 111, 112,
115 (citing BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 146, § 862, at 34, 38-39, § 701, at 198); see also
Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note 21, at nn. 196 197, 204 (citing 1
POMEROY, supra note 7, at 215).
154. Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 505 F.3d 342, 344 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 2995 (2008).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 347-48.
157. Id. at 346.
158. Id.
Make-whole relief has also been the subject of many scholarly articles, all
in support of the argument that it is an equitable remedy under the common
law of trusts.   Since these developments, however, the two sides of the153
make-whole debate have each refined their arguments.
IV. Lining up the Arguments for and Against Make-whole Relief as
“Equitable Relief” Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3)
A. The Stage Is Set—The District Court and the Fifth Circuit Opinions
The defendant plan fiduciaries in Amschwand, not surprisingly, responded
to Mrs. Amschwand’s lawsuit by moving for summary judgment on the basis
that ERISA section 502(a)(3) did not entitle her to relief.   The United States154
District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment,
and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that equitable relief under section
502(a)(3) does not include make-whole relief equal to the insurance benefits
that she would have been entitled absent the alleged fiduciary breach.155
Predictably, both the district and appellate courts held that the relief
requested constituted “money damages” and, therefore, was not available as
“equitable damages” under section 502(a)(3), as interpreted by the Court’s
opinions in Great-West and Sereboff.   In the lower courts, Mrs. Amschwand156
focused on the argument that the Court’s holding in Mertens was narrowly
confined to the unavailability of extra-contractual damages against non-
fiduciaries under section 502(a)(3).   Under this argument, Mertens is157
distinguishable from claims brought by participants and beneficiaries because
make-whole relief against fiduciaries was available as an equitable remedy.158
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159. Medill, supra note 17, at 832. 
160. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief of Respondent in Reply to Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 7-9, LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008) (No.
06-856), 2007 WL 1624842 (citations omitted). 
161. Amschwand, 505 F.3d at 347.  Other courts that have rejected the make-whole argument
are: Goeres v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 220 Fed. Appx. 663 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 2994 (2008); Todisco v. Verizon Commc’ns., Inc., 497 F.3d 95, 99-100 (1st Cir.
2007); Coan v. Kaufman, 457 F.3d 250, 262-64 (2d Cir. 2006) (abrogating Srom v. Goldman,
Sachs & Co., 202 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1999)); Calhoon v. Trans World Airlines, 400 F.3d 593,
596-98 (8th Cir. 2005); Callery v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in the City of N.Y., 392 F.3d 401, 408-09
(10th Cir. 2004); Helfrich v. PNC Bank, Ky., Inc., 267 F.3d 477, 481-82 (6th Cir. 2001); Kerr
v. Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 943-44 (8th Cir. 1999).  Cf. Pereira v. Farace, 413
F.3d 330, 338-40 (2d Cir. 2005) (in a state law breach of trust case, court holds that monetary
relief from a breaching fiduciary is legal relief entitling defendants to jury trial). 
162. Amschwand, 505 F.3d at 347.
163. Id. at 348.  The only appropriate restitutionary remedy for Spehrion’s alleged fiduciary
breach would be return of the “ill-gotten profits, i.e., refund of the policy premiums.”  Id.
(citations omitted).  
164. Medill, supra note 17, at 925-28.  
This status-of-the-defendant distinction was not a novel argument, having
been propounded in several other cases and by other commentators.   The159
Department of Labor had also previously focused on the argument that the
courts must consider the status of the defendant and the nature of the claim in
determining the remedies available under section 502(a)(3).  Unfortunately for
the plaintiffs, the Department of Labor’s position had been rejected several
times.160
Not surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, buttressing its
decision by relying on sister circuit decisions which had also rejected the
fiduciary-distinction argument.   The court also reasoned that the statutory161
text did not support any such distinction between fiduciaries and non-
fiduciaries, instead focusing on the requirement in Great-West to look only to
the nature of the claim and the relief sought.162
Focusing on the relief requested, the court’s characterization is pivotal.
The Fifth Circuit analyzed Amschwand’s request for relief as a request for
restitution, which is unavailable to claimants like Mrs. Amschwand because,
under equitable principles as interpreted by Great-West, restitutionary relief
requires that the defendant (Spherion) be in possession of the wrongfully
withheld funds, which it was not.   Of course, this resort to restitutionary163
analysis neatly side-steps the question of whether, and under what conditions,
make-whole relief was typically available as equitable relief, and this fall-back
to a restitution analysis is simply inapposite.   Make-whole relief is simply164
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165. Unfortunately, characterizing make-whole relief as a form of restitutionary relief is not
unusual at the circuit court level.  Typical of the circuit courts’ failure to distinguish between
make-whole relief and equitable restitution and blind application of the Great-West
restitutionary analysis where it does not belong, is Fox v. Herzog Heine Geduld, Inc., 232 Fed.
Appx. 104, 106 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that, under Great-West, “[i]n order to award equitable
relief under § 502(a)(3), ‘money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the
plaintiff [must] clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.’”)
(citations omitted). 
166. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993).
167. Amschwand Cert. Petition, supra note 29, at *8.
168. Id. (emphasis added).  The Petitioner in Amschwand argued that the distinction was
illustrated by restitution, and as the Court explained in Great-West, restitution was both a legal
and equitable remedy depending on the conditions attached.  Id. at **8-9.
169. Id. at *9.
not a form of restitutionary relief, but when characterized as such, the request
is doomed.   The Fifth Circuit then resorted to Mertens to characterize the165
lost insurance proceeds as make-whole damages.  Characterizing make-whole
relief as “damages” also dooms such relief, because Mertens teaches that
money damages are only available in actions at law.   Blindly applying166
Mertens and Great-West without carefully considering the availability of
make-whole relief as a stand-alone equitable remedy has resulted in a lack of
jurisprudence on this question.  Mrs. Amschwand’s attorney was therefore
faced with refining the make-whole argument for the next round.
B. The Debate Sharpens—Briefing in the Amschwand Petition for
Certiorari
In their petition for certiorari, the plaintiffs took the position that Mertens
supports a distinction between money damages at law and money damages at
equity.  They agreed with the Great-West logic that a remedy such as
restitution or money damages that was available both in law and equity could
not fall within the meaning of “equitable” relief because all legal remedies
were occasionally available in equity courts.   However, such a remedy—one167
that was available in both law and equity courts—could still “constitute
equitable relief if law and equity attach different conditions to the remedy and
the special conditions attached by equity are satisfied.”   The “special168
conditions” for make-whole relief are: (1) that standard equitable defenses
were unavailable and (2) that monetary relief was necessary to cure the
“maladministration” of a trust.   The Department of Labor similarly framed169
the relevant inquiry under Great-West—under what conditions was the make-
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170. Recall that, under Great-West, the determination of whether a remedy is legal or
equitable involves a two part test: “‘the basis for [the plaintiff’s] claim’ and the nature of the
underlying remedies sought.”  Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204,
213 (citing Reich v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.)).
Respondents in Amschwand also argued that Amschwand did not satisfy the first part of the
Great-West test because the nature of her claim was contract-based.  Amschwand Opp. Cert.,
supra note 26, at *7. 
171. Amschwand Opp. Cert., supra note 26, at **10, 14; see also Fiduciaries’ Enron Brief,
supra note 26. 
172. See supra Part II.B.
whole remedy historically available in equity?170
These arguments are subtle, but theoretically sound, and the big question
is whether they are sufficient to distinguish Amschwand from Mertens?
Perversely, prior to Great-West and Sereboff, the answer was probably “no.”
After these decisions, however, the plaintiffs have precedent for the argument.
After all, if Great-West teaches us to unearth arcane distinctions between legal
and equitable forms of restitution, then a good student would follow that
lesson and do exactly what the Amschwand attorneys did—distinguish legal
damages and equitable make-whole monetary relief by looking to special
conditions that equity attached to such relief. 
The inquiry thus sharpened, the plan fiduciary’s stand-by defenses came
into play in full force.  The two-prong attack is that even if make-whole relief
was historically “typically” available as a remedy against a breaching
fiduciary: (1) the duty was only to make the trust corpus whole and therefore
any relief would run to the trust, not to the individual beneficiary; and (2) it
was only available where the trustee mismanaged the trust and/or resulted in
harm to the trust corpus.   Naturally, if the Respondents are correct that harm171
to the trust corpus was historically required, and recovery runs only to the
trust, then Amschwand-type plaintiffs can never recover individualized
monetary relief under the make-whole doctrine.  There is no harm to the trust
corpus, and recovery cannot run to the trust, because the types of employee
welfare benefit plans typically at issue in these cases do not have a trust, and
there simply is no trust corpus as existed in traditional trust law cases.172
The Supreme Court, however, declined the invitation to resolve the debate.
So, the questions still remain: Was make-whole relief typically available in
equity or not?  Who is right, the Department of Labor on the one hand or the
nay-sayers on the other hand?  Heeding the instruction of Justice Scalia to
consult the “standard current works,” the remainder of this Article will
attempt to answer this question.
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173. See, e.g., Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note 21, at 1352-53;
cf. E. Daniel Robinson, Note, Embracing Equity: A New Remedy for Wrongful Health
Insurance Denials, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1469-70 (2006) (arguing that surcharge is
distinguishable from make-whole relief).
174. Id.
175. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 146, § 701, at 193, nn.10-11 (citing §§ 861, 862, and
870 for the separate action in equity, and citing § 970 for the claim of surcharge).
176. Id.
177. Id. § 963, at 41.
178. Id. § 963, at 40-41.
179. Id. § 970, at 360.
180. Id. § 975, at 3.
181. Id. § 971, at 414-20.
182. See id. 
183. Dobbs describes the term “accounting” as an accounting for profits and essentially “a
V. The Make-Whole Relief and Surcharge Argument
A. Distinguishing Between Surcharge and Make-Whole Relief
“Surcharge” is frequently used as a synonym for make-whole relief,173
leading to confusion about the availability of make-whole monetary relief in
equity.   Bogert identifies two separate procedures for pursuing a claim174
against a breaching fiduciary: (1) a separate action in equity for make-whole
relief, or (2) the claim in surcharge on the trustee’s accounting.   Thus, they175
were two procedurally distinguishable mechanisms for a beneficiary to pursue
in obtaining monetary relief against a breaching fiduciary.  The two remedies
are, however, similar in that they both resulted in the same outcome—the
trustee paid money to the beneficiary.
Make-whole relief was available in an independent equitable action, but
surcharge was only available as part of an accounting.   In equity courts, an176
accounting was a substantive duty of the fiduciary to account for “receipts,
disbursements, and property on hand.”   The trustee was required to render177
accounts at regular intervals,  or the beneficiary could initiate an accounting178
procedure in the equity court.   Although the trustee was entitled to179
compensation for services in administering the trust,  the beneficiary could180
hold the fiduciary liable for a variety of charges.   These charges would be181
placed on the debit side of the trustee’s account, but the trustee was personally
liable for the amounts—the amount owed to the fiduciary for serving the
account could be reduced by these charges, or to rephrase, the fiduciary was
“surcharged.”   Although some commentators have declared that the182
surcharge remedy in an accounting was measured by the fiduciary’s ill-gotten
profits—not by the beneficiary’s losses —Bogert identifies many types of183
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restitutionary remedy based upon avoiding unjust enrichment.”  1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES § 4.3(5) (2d ed. 1993).  For an examination of the different types of accounting,
including the accounting against a breaching fiduciary, see generally Joel Eichengrun,
Remedying The Remedy of Accounting, 60 IND. L.J. 463 (1985).
184. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 146, § 971, at 418.
185. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note 21, at 1352-53.
186. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 146, § 971, at 418.  
187. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 525 (Melville M. Bigelow 13th ed. 2000) (1886) (“A surcharge is
appropriately applied to the balance of the whole account, and supposes credits to be omitted
which ought to be allowed.”).
188. But see Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 269 n.3 (White, J., dissenting) (stating
that an accounting does not have an ERISA analogue).  It may be more helpful to think of
make-whole relief and surcharge as the same remedy, but utilizing a different collection method.
surcharges, including damages or losses to the beneficiary caused by a breach
of trust.184
The confusion between surcharge and make-whole relief may appear to be
inconsequential, but it may have had far-reaching consequences for
Amschwand-type plaintiffs.  Professor Langbein suggests that Justice Scalia
may have overlooked money damages as a classic form of equitable relief in
Mertens because of this “terminological oddity.  Damages in equity . . . are
sometimes called ‘surcharge.’”   Indeed, this nomenclature problem persists185
today.  Courts, commentators, the Restatement, and the Uniform Trust Code
continue to refer to monetary relief against a breaching fiduciary as a “charge”
or “surcharge.”  But, as the previous discussion illustrates, the outcome is the
same—monetary relief—and the measure of that relief includes losses to the
beneficiary.186
There may also be a second side-effect of the nomenclature problem.  The
fact that an accounting surcharge would result in a credit on the balance side
of the trust estate  could be the source of the belief that make-whole187
monetary relief was payable only to the trust.  In an accounting action to
impose a surcharge, payment of the surcharge was in effect payment to the
trust only, since the surcharge was a reduction of the fees payable to the
trustee from the trust account.  Further, because it was typically payable to the
trust estate, surcharge rendered through an accounting was a form of make-
whole relief that seems to find its natural analogue in section 502(a)(2).188
The surcharge/make-whole nomenclature problem is an important backdrop
in any attempt to understand and apply the treatises and cases that involve
monetary relief because, as will be evident in the following discussion, these
standard current works are anything but clear. 
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189. Great-West Life & Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217 (2002).
190. Id. at 232 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
191. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referring to conflicting rules in the context of delineating
legal and equitable restitution) (citations omitted).  In general, Justice Ginsburg recognized that
courts have found the law-equity method “‘difficult to apply.’”  Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (calling for analysis that “may seem
to reek unduly of the study”); Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1961); id. at 59
(Clark, J., dissenting) (“‘if not of the museum’”)).  Indeed, the need for a comprehensive
analysis of the availability of make-whole relief under traditional trust law principles is
illustrative of the fact that the Court’s method forces scholars, courts, and litigants to engage in
the “‘recondite controversies better left to legal historians.’”  Great-West, 534 U.S. at 234
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 576 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
192. Justice Scalia relied upon such treatises as Dan B. Dobbs’ Law on Remedies and George
E. Palmer’s Law of Restitution, as well as “the Restatements.”  Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213.
Since Great-West was concerned with the distinction between legal restitution and equitable
restitution, these same standard current works are not necessarily applicable to a determination
of whether make-whole relief was available in equity.  The standard current works on trust law
relief are: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS (1959); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
(1995); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 146; 1 POMEROY, supra note 7.
193. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at *22, Goeres v.
Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., No. 05-15282 (U.S. July 11, 2005), 2005 WL 6184707,
[hereinafter DOL Goeres Brief] (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989)
(plurality opinion)).
B. Consulting the Applicable “Standard Current Works”
In resurrecting the law-equity distinction in Great-West, Justice Scalia
acknowledged the dissent’s argument that lower courts would need to
determine whether relief was available in equity, but he was unconcerned that
such a determination would cause confusion—lower courts simply need to
consult the “standard current works.”   Like Justice Ginsburg, “I question the189
Court’s confidence in the ability of ‘the standard works’ to ‘make the answer
clear.’”   Justice Ginsburg complained that the majority had failed to indicate190
what rule prevailed “when those works conflict, as they do on key points.”191
The surcharge/make-whole nomenclature problem is another example of the
lack of clarity in this area.
This section of the Article seeks to review the text of the “standard current
works” to specifically identify the historical practice and tradition of awarding
make-whole relief against breaching trustees in order to more accurately
determine whether such relief is available under section 502(a)(3), and, if so,
whether any conditions attached to such relief.   In doing so, this Article is192
following the strictures of Justice Scalia to determine the historical equitable
tradition of make-whole relief with specificity rather than generality because
“such general traditions provide such imprecise guidance.”   The inquiry193
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194. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453-54 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J.,
concurring); see also Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(quoting Judge Becker’s concurrence in DiFelice).  “A Serbonian bog is a mess from which
there is no way of extricating oneself.”  DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 454 n.1 (Becker. J., concurring).
195. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note 21, at 1347; see also
Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J.
165, 166 (1997) [hereinafter Langbein, The Secret Life] (referring to the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts as “the most authoritative exposition of American trust law”).  The American Law
Institute revisions of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts has been in progress since the 1980s,
with only certain sections published and other sections still in draft form.  See David M.
English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L.
REV. 143, 147-48 (2002).  Of significance to this article, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts,
Prudent Investor Rule was published in 1992, including the revised sections relating to breach
of fiduciary duty.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) §§ 205-213
(1992).  This Article focuses on both the 1959 and 1992 versions of the Restatement because
the 1959 version was the version in existence when Congress enacted ERISA, and the 1992
revision is the version that constitutes “standard current works,” Great-West, 534 U.S. at 216,
at least until the corresponding sections of the  Restatement (Third) are finalized.
196. Langbein, The Secret Life, supra note 195, at 166 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 1 cmt. b (1959)).  Professor Langbein has argued that Scott was simply incorrect and
that neither the official comments nor reporter’s notes to the Restatement (Second) supplied any
authority for the proposition that many of the rules of trusts do not apply to business trusts.  Id.
at 166.
197. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §1, cmt. a(1) (2003).
demonstrates that, contrary to Justice Scalia’s assertion, delineating make-
whole relief with any specificity under these texts is an invitation to enter the
“Serbonian bog” of confusion.194
1. Restatement (Second) of Trusts
A careful analysis of trust law remedies must begin with the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts, as “the most authoritative source for American trust law
at the time of the enactment of ERISA.”   Any analysis of the applicability195
of the Restatement of Trusts to ERISA must, however, be mindful of the
caution that traditional trust law principles do not always fit within ERISA’s
statutory scheme.  Indeed, the reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Trusts,
Austin W. Scott, excluded commercial trusts from the Restatement.   The196
draft Restatement (Third) of Trusts acknowledges that grafting trust law
principles onto the statutory scheme is possible by stating that the principles
of the Restatement are “generally appropriate” to ERISA actions both by
analogy and to the extent that ERISA “expressly or impliedly incorporate[s]
rules of the general trust law.”   Nevertheless, the Reporter recognized that197
one size does not always fit all:
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198. Id.  Indeed, the Reporter’s Notes for section 1 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts refer
to ERISA plans as “Trusts qualifiedly included.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1,
Reporter’s Notes, § 1(a).
199. Telephone Interview with Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Professor of Law, University of
California Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law, in Jacksonville, Fla. (June 10 & 22, 2009)
[hereinafter Halbach Interview].  Professor Halbach serves as the Reporter for the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts.  The author expresses her appreciation to Professor Halbach for his comments
and assistance in understanding and navigating the Restatement of Trusts, specifically sections
205 and 211 and the comments and illustrations thereto.  
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 (emphasis added).
201. Id. § 197 cmt. a. 
202. The beneficiary’s concurrent right to maintain an action at law occurs where the trustee
is under a duty to the beneficiary to pay money or to transfer a chattel immediately and
unconditionally.  Id. § 198.  Professor Langbein explains that “[i]n such a case the formerly
equitable right has become a matured legal obligation, that is, simply a collection case that no
longer involves issues of trust law.”  Langbein,  What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note
21,  at 1319-20 n.11; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 198 cmt. d (beneficiary
who does not have right to immediate and unconditional payment can bring “a suit in equity to
compel the trustee to restore the money . . . and to hold it in trust or to pay it to a new trustee.”).
Specific provisions and special circumstances or relationships
involved in the application of those statutory rules, however, often
present fundamentally different considerations, thus expressly or
impliedly calling for application of different rules that are not
within the scope of this Restatement except as similar
circumstances are taken into account in the elaboration of general
trust-law principles.198
With this caution in the forefront, a journey through the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts to find an explanation of make-whole relief takes the
traveler on a circuitous route.  The Restatement does not expressly reference
the term “make-whole” relief because that term refers to the more generalized
concept that the trust and/or trust distributions should be made whole or
restored to what they should have been absent a breach; the Restatement
instead attempts to delineate more specifically the types of remedy that might
be appropriate for different types of breach.  199
As an initial matter, section 197 of the Restatement addresses the nature of
the beneficiary’s remedies and states the traditional rule that “the remedies of
the beneficiary against the trustee are exclusively equitable.”   Comment (a)200
explains that an exclusively equitable remedy “is a remedy given by a court
of chancery” or its equivalent.   The exception to the equitable nature of201
remedies referred to in section 197 is that the beneficiary has a concurrent
right to maintain an action at law in certain cases.   202
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203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 199 (emphasis added).  Comment (f) to section
199 further explains the jurisdiction of the court as either quasi in rem to affect interests in the
trust property, or in personam “to subject the trustee to personal liability, or to enjoin him from
committing a breach of trust, or to compel him to make specific reparation for a breach of trust,
or to remove him.”  Id. § 199 cmt. f (emphasis added).
204. Id. § 199 cmt. c.
205. Id. § 205 (emphasis added).  The Amschwand plaintiffs relied on section 205(c) as
incorporating the doctrine of make-whole relief.  See Amschwand Cert. Petition, supra note 29,
at *11.
Having established that the beneficiary’s remedies against a breaching
fiduciary are equitable, the Restatement then proceeds to set forth these
equitable remedies in sections 199 and 205.  Restatement section 199 explains
the beneficiary has the right to file suit:
(a) to compel the trustee to perform his duties as trustee;
(b) to enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust;
(c) to compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust;
(d) to appoint a receiver to take possession of the trust property
and administer the trust;
(e) to remove the trustee.203
The Restatement, therefore, does not expressly identify make-whole relief
as a form of “redress” against a breaching trustee.  It does, however, reiterate
that “[i]f the trustee has committed a breach of trust, the beneficiary can
maintain a suit to compel the trustee to redress the breach of trust.  See §
205.”   Cross-referencing section 205, then, one hopes to locate a clear204
articulation of the make-whole doctrine.  The 1959 version of section
205—the version in effect when Congress enacted ERISA in 1974—simply
provided that a trustee who commits a breach of trust is chargeable with:
(a) any loss or depreciation in value of the trust estate resulting
from the breach of trust; or
(b) any profit made by him through the breach of trust; or
(c) any profit which would have accrued to the trust estate if
there had been no breach of trust.205
The 1992 revised version of Restatement section 205 provides that a
breaching trustee is: 
(a) accountable for any profit accruing to the trust through the
breach of trust; or
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206. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS  (PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) § 205 (1992) (emphasis
added); see also id. § 213 cmt. b (1992) (“The loss from a breach of trust is the amount
necessary to restore the value of the beneficiaries, interests to what their value would have been
if the trust had been properly administered.”).  In addition, the trustee is subject to such liability
as necessary to prevent the trustee from benefiting personally from the breach of trust.  See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 206.  Section 206 clarifies that section 205 liability
applies where the trustee “otherwise violates his duty of loyalty.”  Id.  The duty of loyalty
includes the duty to (1) “administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary” and (2) “to
deal fairly with [the beneficiary] and to communicate to him all material facts in connection with
the transaction which the trustee knows or should know.”  Id. § 170.  
207. The fact that this articulation was not available to Congress in 1974 might render the
availability of the relief less persuasive if the inquiry were focused solely on congressional
intent in 1974, but since Great-West instructs that we focus on the standard current works,
Amschwand-type plaintiffs can plausibly rely on the 1992 version.
208. Professor Halbach confirmed with the author that the 1992 revisions were not meant
to limit the nature of the remedies available to redress a breach of trust, but did render a
substantive change in allowing profit or loss to be attributable to the trustee if the amount of
profit or loss was speculative.  Halbach Interview, supra note 199.
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 198.
210. Id. § 199.
211. Id. § 205(a).  Comment (c) provides that if trust property is lost or destroyed as result
of the trustee’s breach, “the trustee is chargeable with the value of the property so destroyed or
lost.  If as a result of his breach of trust property depreciates in value, the trustee is chargeable
with the amount of such depreciation.”  Id. § 205 (a) cmt. C.  If plan benefits such as life
insurance proceeds are viewed as the trust property, or corpus, the Amschwand family should
be able to charge the plan fiduciary with the value—$426,000.
(b) chargeable with the amount required to restore the values
of the trust estate and trust distributions to what they would have
been if the trust had been properly administered.206
The 1992 version of the Restatement section 205(b) is a clearer articulation
of what we have termed “make-whole” relief.   It is noteworthy that the207
Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Professor Edward C. Halbach,
Jr., confirms that the 1992 revisions to Section 205 were not intended to
substantively change the remedies available against a breaching fiduciary
available under the 1959 version; both the 1959 and 1992 versions restate the
common law approach which had always included the amount necessary to
restore the trust and/or trust distributions to what they should have been
absent the breach.  208
   To recap, the Restatement’s view of the beneficiary’s equitable remedies
against a breaching trustee can be summarized as follows.  A beneficiary’s
remedies against a breaching fiduciary are exclusively equitable,  and209
include holding the trustee liable to redress such breach,  either by charging210
the trustee with any profit made from the breach  or charging the trustee211
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212. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) § 205.  
213. The author expresses thanks to Professor Halbach for this point.  Professor Langbein
also  asserts that “[m]oney damages are the routine mode of redress.”  Langbein, What ERISA
Means by “Equitable,” supra note 21, at 1352.
214. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE) §211 Illust. 1, at 162
(1992).  
215. Id. § 205 cmt. a.  The 1959 version of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts section 205
comment (a) provided that the beneficiary has the option of “pursuing a remedy which will put
him in the position in which he would have been if the trustee had not committed the breach of
trust. . . .  The situations under which the various remedies are available are considered in the
Comments to the three clauses of this Section.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt.
a.
with the amount required to restore the values of the trust estate and/or trust
distributions to what they would have been absent the breach.   212
Nowhere does the Restatement state that equity attached any particular
conditions to this form of “redress” such as a requirement that monetary
awards are payable only to the trust.  To the contrary, the Restatement clearly
contemplates situations where monetary awards are appropriately made
directly to the beneficiary, thereby refuting the argument that monetary
awards can run only to the trust corpus. Not only does section 205(b)
expressly provide for restoration of the trust to what it would have been
absent the breach, but it expressly provides for restoration of trust
distributions as a form of redress.  Restoration of trust distributions—or
income—would necessarily be to the beneficiary, not to the trust corpus, and
“the amount necessary to restore the value of” such distributions would of
course be a monetary amount.   Illustrative of this point is a comment to213
Restatement (Third) section 211, which provides an example of monetary
redress payable directly to a beneficiary in an appropriate case: “[i]f the
income of the trust is to be distributed to [beneficiary], any income recovery
from [trustee] belongs to [beneficiary].”   214
Further, comment (a) to section 205 explains that “the beneficiaries may
surcharge the trustee for the amount necessary to compensate fully for the
consequences of the breach.”   This reference to surcharge, unfortunately,215
confuses the matter.  If the beneficiary is to be made whole, must it be
through a “surcharge”?  As explained in Part V.A, surcharge and make-whole
relief are often used interchangeably, and the accounting context for
surcharge seems to have been lost in modern day trust terminology, but they
result in the same outcome—the payment of money by the fiduciary.
Monetary relief awarded as a surcharge in an accounting action would appear
to have run to the trust as a practical matter—when the trustee settles the
account, he is charged with any liabilities and thus, payment of commission
from the trust estate would be reduced by that amount.  Surcharge in an
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216. See infra Part V.B.
217. Id.
218. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205(b).
219. Id. § 213 cmt. b.  Note that although section 213 was not revised in 1992, the comments
were revised.
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. c, illus. 2-3.
221. Id. § 170 cmt. o.
accounting action would therefore have typically been paid through the trust
estate.  ERISA section 502(a)(2) and section 409(a)—which require that
losses to the plan be paid to the plan—appear to mirror the typical surcharge-
through-accounting action.  But, surcharge through an accounting was not the
only procedure through which a fiduciary paid monetary awards to a
beneficiary.   An aggrieved beneficiary could also seek “redress” through an216
independent action in equity.   Just as surcharge was not the only mechanism217
for obtaining make-whole relief under traditional trust law, ERISA section
502(a)(2) is not the only mechanism for obtaining relief under ERISA.
ERISA section 502(a)(3) is also available for seeking “redress” against a
breaching fiduciary.
Neither does the Restatement limit recovery to situations where the trust
corpus is harmed.  Granted, in a typical breach of trust case, the corpus will
be harmed, but harm to the trust corpus is nowhere stated in the Restatement
as a condition for recovery.  If the beneficiary of a trust is an income
beneficiary and his distribution or  income is harmed, he would be entitled to
recover his losses.    The comments and illustrations provide further support218
for the proposition that “loss” is not limited to direct harm to the trust corpus,
but includes less tangible harm to a beneficiary’s interests in trust assets.
Restatement section 213, comment (b) provides: “[t]he loss from a breach of
trust is the amount necessary to restore the value of the beneficiaries’ interests
to what their value would have been if the trust had been properly
administered.”   The illustrations following comment (b) indicate that such219
loss may include less tangible losses that are more analogous to the
Amschwand-type claim than the typical harm-to-corpus claim.  For example,
illustrations 2 and 3 explain that a claim can be a trust asset, and if the trustee
negligently fails to collect on the claim, he is liable for the amount of the
claim.   The failure to collect on a claim is analogous to a failure to preserve220
an asset such as a life insurance policy.  
Other illustrations can be found in the Restatement that demonstrate the
rule that liability extends to situations where there is less direct harm to a trust
corpus.  Thus, a trustee who receives a bonus or commission from a third
party for an act done by the trustee in connection with trust administration is
liable for breach of the duty of loyalty.   Examples include a bonus from a221
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222. Id.
223. Id. § 206 cmt. k.
224. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 95 (approved May 2009).
225. Id.
226. See DOL Enron Brief, supra note 145 (“As stated in the Restatement on Trusts . . .
monetary relief against breaching fiduciaries is equitable when it restores the beneficiary to ‘the
position [in which] he would have been if the trustee had not committed the breach of trust.’”
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a)); see also DOL Amschwand Brief,
supra note 3.
227. See, e.g., Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note 21, at 16.  Reliance
on The Uniform Trust Code and the 1992 revisions to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
(Prudent Investor Rule) section 205 reveals the internal inconsistency in the debate about make-
whole relief discussed, infra Part V.B.  On the one hand, Justice Scalia instructed courts to
third party for making a sale of trust property, or receiving a commission for
placing trust insurance with his employer insurance company.   The trustee222
is accountable to the beneficiary for the amount of the bonus.   Although the223
corpus is harmed in the sense that a loyal trustee would have paid the gain to
the trust, the Restatement simply does not condition trustee liability for these
types of breaches of the duty of loyalty on any resultant harm to trust corpus.
Additional clarification—indeed, confirmation—of the rights of the
beneficiary against a breaching trustee is forthcoming in the most recently
approved revisions to the Restatement.  Restatement (Third) of Trusts section
95 provides a general statement that the “remedies of trust beneficiaries are
equitable in character”  and expressly states:224
If a breach of trust causes a loss, including any failure to realize
income, capital gain, or appreciation that would have resulted from
proper administration, the beneficiaries are entitled to restitution
and may have the trustee surcharged for the amount necessary to
compensate fully for the consequences of the breach.  225
The Restatement could not, therefore, be more clear on this point; the
Department of Labor’s litigation position is that the Restatement squarely
provides that monetary relief is available against a breaching fiduciary,  and226
as demonstrated above, the language of the Restatement seems to support this
view with a relatively clear articulation of the general doctrine of make-whole
relief.  Simply put, nothing in the Restatement supports the view that harm to
the trust corpus is required or that section 205 monetary remedies run only to
the trust, not to the individual beneficiary.
2. The Uniform Trust Code of 2000
Proponents of the make-whole remedy also rely heavily on the Uniform
Trust Code of 2000.   The Uniform Trust Code is a codification of the law227
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consult the “standard current works” in deciding whether a remedy is equitable.  Great-West
Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217 (2002).  Uniform laws and the
Restatement certainly fit that description.  On the other hand, since the inquiry at hand is to
ascertain whether a particular remedy was typically available in pre-fusion equity courts, it is
anomalous to consult modern sources to assist in that inquiry.  Of course, therein lays the fallacy
of Justice Scalia’s law-equity distinction in understanding congressional intent in 1974 and
beyond.  
228. English, supra note 195, at 144-48 (reviewing the drafting project, rationale, and
process and setting forth the provisions of the Uniform Trust Code).
229. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1001(b)(3) (amended 2001), 7C U.L.A. 221 (Supp. 2003).
230. Id. § 1002; see also Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note 21, at
1336-37 (asserting that the Uniform Trust Code section 1002(a)(1) codifies the standard of
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, reaffirmed in Restatement (Third) of Trusts (Prudent Investor
Rule) section 205 (1992)).
231. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1001 cmt. (“The availability of a remedy in a particular
circumstance will be determined not only by this Code but also by the common law of trusts and
principles of equity.”).
232. Id.
of trusts, drawing largely upon the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, as well as
Bogert and Scott.   Of particular interest in the uniform code is section228
1001(b)(3), which expands on Restatement section 199(c) by providing:
“[T]he court may . . . compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust by paying
money.”   Section 1002 further provides that a breaching trustee may be held229
liable “to the beneficiaries affected for . . . the amount required to restore the
value of the trust property and trust distributions to what they would have
been had the breach not occurred.”230
Although not a source that Congress would have relied upon in 1974 when
enacting ERISA, the Uniform Trust Code is, however, informed by the
Restatement and the common law of trusts.   Specifically, the uniform code231
provides that the remedies identified in section 1001(b)(3) are derived from
Restatement (Second) of Trusts section 199 and that “[t]he reference to
payment of money in subsection (b)(3) includes liability that might be
characterized as damages, restitution, or surcharge.”   The comment to232
section 1002 explained:
Subsection (a) is based on Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent
Investor Rule Section 205 (1992).  If a trustee commits a breach of
trust, the beneficiaries may either affirm the transaction or, if a loss
has occurred, hold the trustee liable for the amount necessary to
compensate fully for the consequences of the breach.  This may
include recovery of lost income, capital gain, or appreciation that
would have resulted from proper administration. . . . For extensive
commentary on the determination of damages, traditionally known
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233. Id.  The Uniform Code appears to mis-cite the Restatement (Third).  The Restatement
(Third) of Trusts is in progress and not all sections have been published.  Sections 205-211 of
Restatement (Third) have not yet been published, but these sections of Restatement (Second)
were revised in 1992.  
234. Richard Wellman was the Chair of the Drafting Committee, Reporter, or Member of the
Committee for the Uniform Trust Code.
235. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 146; 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 84.
236. Langbein, The Secret Life, supra note 195, at 166.  Professor Langbein explains that
although Scott excluded commercial trusts from his treatise, Scott was incorrect in his belief that
trust law did not apply to commercial trusts.  Id. at 166 n.7 (citing 1 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra
note 84, § 2.2, at 40 (4th ed. 1987)).  George C. Bogert’s treatise at least introduced the concept
that trust law applied to certain types of business trusts.  Langbein, The Secret Life, supra note
195, at 166 n.8 (citing BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 146, at 247-51, 255).  The Uniform Trust
Code also recognizes that trust law typically applies in the estate planning or donative context
and notes that commercial trusts may depart from the usual trust law rules.  UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 102 cmt.
237. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625,
637-43 (1995) (discussing how the trust device was originally a device for conveying freehold
land but shifted to a management device for holding financial assets).
as trustee surcharge, with numerous specific applications, see
Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule Sections 205-
213 (1992).233
The Uniform Trust Code, then, is somewhat circular in that it brings us
back to the Restatement, specifically section 205.  And, like the Restatement,
the Uniform Trust Code is supportive of the general availability of make-
whole relief but does not address the pivotal questions of whether any
conditions attached to this form of relief.   The Uniform Trust Code was234
also informed by the treatises of George C. Bogert and Austin W. Scott, and
it is to these “standard current works” that we now turn.
3. Bogert, Scott and Other Trust Law Treatises
Underlying both the Restatement and the Uniform Trust Code are the great
trust law treatises written by Bogert and Scott.   It is noteworthy that neither235
Bogert nor Scott, both authorities on traditional trust law principles, including
remedies, believed that trust rules applied to commercial trusts.   This might236
be a partial explanation for the paucity of cases in those treatises dealing with
beneficiary remedies for the types of commercial trusts that ERISA governs.
The other explanation is that ERISA’s commercial trust model was unknown
at the time these treatises were first written.   It does not follow, however,237
that traditional equitable remedies against breaching trustees were not grafted
into ERISA section 502(a)(3)—but we should recognize that it is not a perfect
fit and that, as the reporters of the Restatement (Third) advised, we must look
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238. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1, reporter’s notes, cmt. a (1992).  As Justice Scalia
noted, courts should look to “standard current works” when determining what equitable
remedies were available.  Great-West Life & Annuity Life Ins. Co., 534 U.S. 204, 217 (2002);
see also E. Daniel Robinson, Note, Embracing Equity: A New Remedy for Wrongful Health
Insurance Denials, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1467-68 (2006) (discussing the Court’s reliance on
standard treatises in support of author’s argument that surcharge is a form of equitable relief that
is distinguishable from make-whole relief).  In Great-West, Justice Scalia stated that the Court
consulted such works as “Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements.”  534 U.S. at 217.
Because the remedy at issue in Great-West was restitution, Justice Scalia referred to Corbin on
Contracts, Dobbs’s Law of Remedies, Palmer’s Law on Restitution, and the Restatements of
Contracts and Restitution.  Id. at 211-212,  Justice Scalia’s passing reference to the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts sections 252, 255 (1959) was only to reject the Department of Labor’s
reliance on these sections as authority for the proposition that a trustee could enforce an
agreement by a beneficiary to pay money.  Id. at 718.  Justice Scalia’s analysis of the
Department of Labor’s position evidences his impatience with litigants’ attempts to squeeze a
square peg (monetary remedies akin to breach of contract made payable from other monies) into
a round hole (the equitable right of a trustee to set-off monies due to trustee from amounts due
under the trust).    
239. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 146, § 701, at 198.
240. Id. § 701, at 191 (discussing extent of trustee’s financial liability for breach of duties
in making (or failing to make), retaining, or selling trust investments).
241. Section 862 addresses the procedural aspects of claims against a breaching trustee for
payment of money damages.  Id. § 862, at 34.
242. Id. § 701, at 198.
243. Id.   
to “similar circumstances” when applying general trust-law principles to
ERISA’s statutory scheme.238
a) Bogert
Proponents of make-whole relief rely on Bogert sections 701 and 862.239
Bogert section 701 addresses trustee liability for breach of investment duties,
with an emphasis on money damages as a remedy,  and it lays out some240
general underlying principles that are reiterated in section 862.   Although241
section 701 addresses remedies only for a subset of fiduciary
breaches—breach of investment duties—Bogert explains that the remedies
available for investment breaches are “determined by the general rule that the
object of damages is to make the injured party whole, that is, to put him in the
same condition in which he would have been if the wrong had not been
committed and the trustee had done his duty.”   Further, Bogert states that242
“[b]oth direct and consequential damages may be awarded.”   Bogert243
therefore provides the clearest acknowledgment and support for the notion of
make-whole relief as a traditional trust law remedy.
Nevertheless, opponents of the doctrine also rely on Bogert section 701 for
the counter argument that the harm sought to be remedied by make-whole
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244. Id. § 701, at 199.
245. See infra Part V.C.1.
246. See, e.g., Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note 21, at 1337; see
also DOL Amschwand Brief, supra note 3. 
247. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 146, § 862, at 34.
248. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 (1959).
249. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 146, § 862, at 34.
250. See infra Part V.C.
relief is harm to the trust corpus because Bogert states the general rule that
the beneficiary must prove that the trustee’s act or omission “has caused a
diminution of the trust income or principal.”   The counter argument is that244
if we should simply accept the reality that the trust “income or principle” in
an ERISA plan is the plan itself or the plan proceeds, then it follows that the
trustee’s acts or omissions in an Amschwand-type claim have in fact caused
a diminution—actually a complete loss—of the “trust income or principal.”245
It is absurd to think that Congress would have extended the substantive duties
and obligations of a trustee to ERISA plan fiduciaries but at the same time
limit the remedies available under traditional trust law to those situations
where the trust corpus is harmed.
Bogert section 862 addresses the procedural aspects of obtaining monetary
relief against a breaching fiduciary and is perhaps the most oft-cited provision
for the availability of make-whole relief.   Section 862’s title, however, only246
serves to highlight the law-equity dilemma: “Decree Against the Trustee for
the Payment of Money–Damages.”   If a beneficiary’s remedies against a247
breaching trustee are “exclusively equitable,”  then why does Bogert section248
862 refer to such relief as “damages”—the quintessential form of legal relief?
Once again, we must dig deeper into this particular standard current work to
attempt to unravel this confusion between make-whole relief and legal
damages.
Section 862 states: “For a breach of trust the trustee may be directed by the
court to pay damages to the beneficiary out of the trustee’s own funds . . . .”249
In support, Bogert cites several cases that, while they support the general
proposition that the court can order the trustee to pay money to the aggrieved
beneficiary, are simply not analogous to the Amschwand plight.250
Moreover, Bogert section 862 further provides that the beneficiary may
bring a separate action for damages, or can ask for surcharge on an
accounting.  Bogert listed the types of breach of trust that would give rise to
either a separate suit or a surcharge on an accounting—none are analogues for
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251. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 146, § 862, at 36-39 (listing unauthorized payments to
other beneficiaries, conversion of trust property, negligence in recording of instruments
affecting trust property or obtaining security or collecting trust property, wrongful sale of trust
property, or negligence or misconduct in investments).      
252. Id. § 157, at 558 (cited in Fiduciaries’ Enron Brief, supra note 26).
253. Id. § 862, at 34 n.1 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (PRUDENT INVESTOR
RULE) § 205 (1992); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197; Liability for Breaches of
Fiduciary Duties, 1 PROF. LIABILITY RPTR. 116 (1977); Thomas J. McDermott, Jr., Note,
Liability of Trustee for Appreciation of Property. 4 UCLA L. REV. 314 (1957); Russell D. Niles,
Contemporary View of Liability for Breach of Trust, 29 REC. OF THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF N.Y. 573 (1974)).  
the Amschwand-type claims.   Again, this is hardly surprising since these251
types of claims were virtually unknown in the private trust world.
More troubling from the perspective of Amschwand-type plaintiffs is that
Bogert elsewhere supports the argument that monetary awards are payable to
the trust:
A failure to perform any of the duties placed upon [the trustee]
by common law, statute or trust instrument, if loss is caused
thereby, will give the beneficiaries, a co-trustee or a successor
trustee a right to secure from the court of equity a decree that the
wrongdoing trustee pay into the trust fund the amount of damages
suffered.252
Bogert is likely merely stating the practical reality of most private trusts that
the trust fund was the obvious recipient of relief, but even in this light, section
157 is a stark reminder that Amschwand-type plaintiffs face significant
hurdles analogizing their ERISA claims to the traditional trust law model.
Thus, what can we learn from Bogert with respect to make-whole relief of the
type sought by the Amschwand plaintiffs?  At best, the generalized
proposition that the law of trusts recognized monetary relief payable from the
trustee’s own funds to the beneficiary’s trust fund.  But with the caveat that
the sources relied upon—even by Bogert—are not analogous to the situation
at hand. 
Since the Bogert treatise does not satisfactorily resolve the debate of what
conditions attached to make-whole relief, an exploration of Bogert’s sources
is the next logical step in ascertaining whether make-whole relief is available
in Amschwand-type claims.   Bogert section 862 relied upon the Restatement253
(Second) of Trusts section 197 and Restatement (Third) of Trusts section 205,
discussed in Part V.B.1 Bogert’s other sources were less well-known and it
is to these sources that we now turn, digging deeper into the Serbonian bog.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
766 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  61:721
254. Niles, supra note 253.    
255. Id. at 573 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) (Cardozo, J.)).
256. Id. at 573-74.  Professor Niles noted that the Restatement (Second) of Trusts may also
have adopted this more relaxed, contemporary standard.  Id. at 581 (citing, inter alia,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205(a)).   
257. Niles, supra note 253, passim.
258. Id. at 598 (distinguishing between restitutionary remedy and compensatory remedy).
259. Professor Niles, however, commented on a California case that is remarkably similar
to the Goeres case.  In Estate of Talbot, 296 P.2d 848 (Cal. App. 1956), a beneficiary argued
that a trustee breached his duty by improperly delegating his power of sale to another
beneficiary, who sold trust securities instead of retaining them.  Had the trust retained the
securities, their value would have increased by $250,000. Id. at 856.  The California court did
not impose liability because the beneficiary could not establish a causal connection between the
original breach and the loss.  Niles, supra note 253, at 581-82 (noting the development in trust
law away from imposing strict liability and toward a proximate cause requirement).   
260. Niles, supra note 253, at 577-78 (citing Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969)
(discussing application of trust law principles to corporate fiduciaries)).  
(1) Professor Niles—An ERISA Contemporary
For the rule that monetary relief was available against a breaching trustee,
Bogert also relied upon a published lecture given by Professor Russell D.
Niles in 1973 regarding current developments in the law of trusts.254
Professor Niles’s lecture, therefore, reflected trust law developments
contemporaneously with congressional drafting of ERISA.  Professor Niles’s
lecture focused on New York trust law and cases involving the trustee’s duty
of “‘undivided loyalty.’”   Professor Niles was particularly concerned with255
developments in trust law reflecting a modern judicial trend away from
imposing strict liability on trustees towards a more relaxed view of liability
whereby courts were starting to require a showing of causation and to base the
amount of liability on the amount or degree of culpability.256
Of note, Professor Niles apparently saw nothing unusual or unique in the
rule that trustees could be personally liable for monetary damages—he
interchangeably referred to such remedial relief as compensatory damages or
surcharge.   Although his choice of words is unfortunate, Professor Niles257
was simply referring to the make-whole remedy as a compensatory remedy.258
Although acknowledging the existence of the make-whole remedy, Professor
Niles did not, however, expand on whether it was only available where the
trustee’s breach resulted in harm to the corpus.   He did observe that New259
York courts were applying trust law principles to impose liability on corporate
fiduciaries in insider-trading situations where there was no harm to the
corporation,  but that was not the core focus of his article, and it offers260
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261. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 146, § 862, at 34 n.1 (citing McDermott, supra note
249). 
262. McDermott, supra note 253, at 315.  The author noted that in addition to duties
imposed by the trust instrument, other duties imposed by law include the duty to exercise
ordinary care and skill, duty of loyalty, duty of good faith dealing with the cestui, duty to
preserve trust property, and the duty to make the trust property productive.  Id. at 314 n.4.
263. Id.  As we have seen with the Bogert treatise and with Professor Niles’s commentary,
the tendency to refer to make-whole relief and surcharge as “damages” is, well, damaging.  One
could write this off as simply another nomenclature problem, but that explanation still would
not answer the underlying question of what conditions, if any, attach to such relief, whatever
it is called.
264. Id. at 315 (emphasis added, citations omitted).  
265. Id. at 317-18.  McDermott referred to the make-whole measure of damages as surcharge
without explaining the procedural distinction between bringing a separate action on the breach
or an action for an accounting.  See supra Part V.A.   
limited insight beyond the generalized proposition that make-whole monetary
relief was available against a breaching fiduciary.
(2) Law Reviews
Bogert also relied on a law review note summarizing statutory and case law
support for imposing individual liability on a trustee for appreciation of
property.   The commentator, McDermott, noted the seemingly261
unremarkable rule that “[f]or a breach of any of these duties a trustee may be
liable for damages.”   Like Professor Niles, McDermott’s explanation of262
these “damages”  reveals that he was in fact referring to surcharge or make-263
whole relief, explaining:
The theory of these surcharges is to make the cestui “whole”
again, and this usually results in awarding the beneficiary either
the loss actually sustained by the trust (depreciation) or the profit
which would have accrued had the trustee carried out his duties
properly (appreciation).  The type of breach, considered with the
circumstances of the case, will generally determine the award.264
For this measure of “damages,” McDermott relied on Restatement
(Second) of Trusts section 205, which, as we have seen, allows the
beneficiary to recover losses caused by the breach.  As we have also seen,
however, the Restatement does not definitively answer the vital
questions—whether an action can only lie where the breach resulted in harm
to the trust corpus and whether recovery must be payable to the trust corpus.
McDermott sought to explain the different measure of relief awarded by
courts (depreciation versus appreciation) and concludes that different types
of breach account for the difference.   The author concludes that265
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266. McDermott, supra note 253, at 316.
267. Id. at 317-18.
268. Id. at 315.  McDermott’s suggestion is echoed in Professor Medill’s comprehensive
categorization of the types of equitable relief depending on the type of claim or breach.  See
generally Medill, supra note 17.    
269. Amschwand Opp. Cert., supra note 26, at *11.
270. McDermott, supra note 253, at 317.
271. Id. at 317 n.18.
272. The “appreciation” and “depreciation” measure of damages is echoed in Bogert section
862 and was codified by several states prior to the enactment of ERISA.  Thus, the familiar
measures were: (1) loss or depreciation in value of the trust estate resulting from the breach
[depreciation]; (2) any profit made by the trustee through the breach; and (3) any amount that
would have accrued to the trust estate or the beneficiary if there had been no breach of trust
[appreciation].    
depreciation damages that are limited to restoration of the actual loss to the
corpus are appropriate for “a ‘good faith’ mistake which amounts to a mere
technical breach of an objective standard of conduct, as where a power of sale
exists but the trustee does not properly exercise his discretion.”   Relief (in266
the form of damages) is limited by the policy of avoiding making the trustee
a “guarantor of profits.”   In contrast, appreciation damages (which would267
include restoration of loss of income) may be awarded for “bad faith”
breaches, such as self-dealing for the trustee’s own gain, but could also
include good faith breaches that involved a breach of the actual terms of the
trust or breach of a “more serious fiduciary duty.”268
McDermott’s explanation of the measure of relief is illuminating because
it seeks to explain the differing measures of relief actually awarded by pre-
fusion equity courts to redress breaches of fiduciary duty.  The “depreciation”
and “appreciation” awards identified by McDermott (which echo the
Restatement) can more easily be analogized to the modern ERISA
Amschwand-type cases.  Thus, depreciation damages were limited to
restoration of actual loss to the trust corpus, did not include lost profits, and
were available for “technical” breaches such as failing to exercise
independent judgment in making a sale.  This is the measure of damages that
the plan defendants in Amschwand appear to identify in support of their
argument that, to the extent the make-whole remedy is available, it is limited
to a return of premiums paid.269
But, the type of breach, and, therefore, the correct measure of damages at
issue in Amschwand is more appropriately characterized as more than a mere
technical or good faith breach, it is a breach of “a more serious fiduciary
duty”  such as breach of duty of loyalty.   Therefore, appreciation damages270 271
should be the amount of what the beneficiary would have accrued in the
absence of the breach of trust—i.e., the insurance proceeds.272
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273. 1 POMEROY, supra note 7.
274. Id. § 157-58, at 213-14.
275. Id. § 157, at 213-14.  
276. Id. § 157, at 214.  
277. Id.     
To recap, digging deeper into the world of Bogert, which is arguably the
gold-standard of the standard current works, has yielded mixed results.  Like
the Restatement and the Uniform Trust Code, Bogert generally supports the
availability of make-whole relief but tells us little about what conditions
might have attached in equity, except that Bogert section 157 supports the
argument that recovery must run to the trust fund.
b) Pomeroy
Pomeroy’s treatise on equity jurisprudence also typifies the confusion
surrounding make-whole relief.   Like Bogert, Pomeroy makes seemingly273
contradictory statements about equity jurisdiction and remedies.  In section
158, Pomeroy explained the nature of the equity court’s jurisdiction over trust
law cases.  Pomeroy explained that equity courts had exclusive jurisdiction
over trusts created by private owners of property  but that courts of law and274
equity had concurrent jurisdiction over other fiduciary relations, such as
guardianships and corporate directors.   In those cases, Pomeroy wrote that275
the law “supplies the beneficiaries with sufficient remedies for many
violations of such fiduciary relations.”   This is problematic because it276
suggests that a court of law supplies the legal damages for commercial trust
claims, such as ERISA claims.
Nevertheless, even in those cases, Pomeroy stated that “equity possesses
a jurisdiction in many instances where its remedies are more effective, or its
modes of procedure enable the court to do more complete justice by its
decrees.”   Pomeroy went on to explain that equity jurisdiction was277
independent of the nature of the remedies:
The actual remedies which a court of equity gives depend upon
the nature and object of the trust; sometimes they are specific in
their character, and of a kind which the law courts cannot
administer, but often they are of the same general kind as those
obtained in legal actions, being mere recoveries of money.  A court
of equity will always by its decree declare the rights, interest, or
estate of the cestui que trust, and will compel the trustee to do all
the specific acts required of him by the terms of the trust.  It often
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278. Id. § 158, at 215 (cited in Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note
21, at 1350-51).  
279. The equity courts’ remedial power is mirrored in ERISA section 502(a), as Professor
Langbein explained.  Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note 21, at 1335.
Recovery for losses and profits, and other foregone gains, is mirrored in section 502(a)(2), at
least for cases in which relief runs to the plan, and section 502(a)(3) “vindicates the core
principle of trust remedy law, the make-whole standard.”  Id.
280. 1 POMEROY, supra note 7, § 158, at 215.  Pomeroy’s reference to the single payment
of money or an accounting makes it clear that these were two separate procedures but
nevertheless involved the same end result—the beneficiary’s recovery of money from the
breaching trustee.  This analysis therefore tracks Bogert’s treatise, discussed in Part V.B.3,
supra.  
281. 4 POMEROY, supra note 7, § 1080, at 230 (emphasis added).  Defense attorneys have
seized upon Pomeroy’s statement that monetary relief was available where the trust property has
been lost or put beyond the beneficiary’s reach as illustrative of the argument that make-whole
relief was only available where the trust corpus was harmed.  See Amschwand Respondents’
Supp. Brief, supra note 151, at *8.  The actual text simply does not support this proposition, and
the argument can, in any event, be readily dismissed when recognizing that the trust property
or corpus consists of the plan proceeds, which have undisputedly been lost or put beyond reach
in Amschwand-type cases.
282. 1 POMEROY, supra note 7, § 158, at 215.
happens that the final relief to be obtained by the cestui que trust
consists in the recovery of money.278
Pomeroy’s statement that the equity court had this power to award
monetary relief “when necessary” is arguably echoed in ERISA section
502(a)(3), which contemplates an award of other “appropriate” equitable
relief.   Indeed, in this same section—section 158—Pomeroy referenced the279
equity courts’ power to decree monetary recovery “when necessary” by
payment of either “a single specific sum” or through an accounting.280
Finally, in a later section of his treatise expressly dealing with the nature
and extent of trustee liability, Pomeroy squarely tells us that:
In addition to this claim of the beneficiary upon the trust estate
as long as it exists, the trustee incurs a personal liability for a
breach of trust by way of compensation or indemnification, which
the beneficiary may enforce at his election, and which becomes his
only remedy whenever the trust property has been lost or put
beyond his reach by the trustee’s wrongful act.281
Thus, Pomeroy’s commentary on concurrent law-equity jurisdiction can be
reconciled by reference to the different types of claims—“the nature and
object of the trust.”   When the trust is “general” and the relief is “general”282
(i.e., the “mere recovery of monies”), the law court would have jurisdiction.
But, when the claim is of a kind that requires the specialized jurisdiction of
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283. Id. 
284. 4 POMEROY, supra note 7, § 1080, at 230.
285. Id. § 1080, at 229.
286. Justice Ginsburg predicted this eventuality in her dissent in Great-West Life & Annuity
Insurance Co. v. Knudson.  534 U.S. 204, 232 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I question the
Court’s confidence in the ability of ‘the standard works’ to ‘make the answer clear.’”).  Justice
Ginsburg highlighted as illustrative a conflict between Dobbs and the Restatement of Restitution
on the issue of the availability of restitutionary relief in an equity court.  Id. (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “the Court does not indicate what rule prevails, for example, when those
works conflict, as they do on key points, compare Restatement of Restitution § 160, comment
e, p. 645 (1936) (constructive trust over money available only where transfer procured by abuse
of fiduciary relation or where legal remedy inadequate), with 1 Dobbs, Law of Remedies §
4.3(2), at 595, 597 (limitation of constructive trust to ‘misdealings by fiduciaries’ a
‘misconception’; adequacy of legal remedy ‘seems irrelevant’).”).  
the equity court—because it requires the court to “declare the rights, interest,
or estate of the cestui que trust”—jurisdiction will lie in equity, even when
the final relief is recovery of money.   Pomeroy names this “complete283
indemnification and compensation of the beneficiary”  “a simple contract284
equitable debt.”   Whatever we label it, this relief is monetary relief, and it285
was routinely awarded by a court of equity.
C. Understanding and Applying Pre-Fusion Trust Cases to ERISA plans
To recap, in determining whether Amschwand-type plaintiffs can recover
make-whole relief under ERISA’s equitable relief provision, the primary
resources, at least according to Justice Scalia, are the “standard current
works.”  As demonstrated in Parts V.A-B above, however, the relevant
treatises are hardly unequivocal on this point.  The Restatement (Second) of
Trusts, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, and the Uniform Trust Code are
relatively clear that a beneficiary can directly recover from the trustee for his
losses, but Bogert and Pomeroy are not a model of clarity on this crucial
question.   In addition, none of these authorities address whether equity286
attached any particular conditions to such monetary relief— although the fact
that none of them mention any such conditions indicates that such conditions
were not required.  This lack of clarity not only vividly illustrates Justice
Ginsburg’s suspicion that the standard current works would not necessarily
supply a ready answer for courts attempting to determine whether a relief
qualifies as equitable under Great-West, but provides an escape hatch for
breaching fiduciaries.  After all, if the standard current works fail to disclose
what conditions, if any, attached to make-whole relief, then a clever attorney
can find some.  Hence, the fiduciaries’ two-prong attack is that make-whole
relief was traditionally limited to situations where: (1) the breach resulted in
harm to the corpus—because that would typically be the result in cases
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287. See Amschwand Respondents’ Supp. Brief, supra note 151, at *8.  The argument that
make-whole relief was only available in cases involving self-dealing is misplaced for the simple
reason that self-dealing cases usually involved restitutionary relief, not make-whole relief.  To
the extent that make-whole relief was appropriate, such relief was not dependant on harm to the
corpus.  In self-dealing cases, the harm was in the egregiousness of the breach, and courts were
more likely to impose restitutionary relief through imposition of a constructive trust in order to
deter self-dealing and prevent unjust enrichment.  See also Niles, supra note 253.  Opponents
of make-whole relief do not seem to disagree with the general rule that the trustee can be held
personally liable for make-whole damages.  See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 146, § 862 n.2
and cases cited therein.
288. Amschwand Respondents’ Supp. Brief, supra note 151, at *8 n.3 (“Without exception,
all of the cases and commentaries cited by the Government . . . relate solely to relief in the event
of harm to, or self-dealing with, the trust corpus . . . by the trustee . . . charged with its care.”).
289. A trust relationship requires a trustee, a beneficiary (cestui), and trust property.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. h (1959).  Under ERISA, trust property is not
required.  See Muir, Fiduciary Status, supra note 46, at 395-96. 
involving traditional trusts; and (2) payment was made back into the trust
corpus— because that would be typically be the result under traditional trust
law.287
At this juncture, because the standard current works do not address what,
if any, conditions traditionally attached to make-whole relief, it becomes
necessary to resort to pre-fusion equity cases.  After all, the standard current
works restate the common law of trusts as developed by the equity courts, so
hopefully Justice Scalia will pardon the rerouting of the inquiry.
1. The Argument That Make-Whole Relief Was Traditionally Limited to
Cases Where the Trust Corpus Was Harmed is Irrelevant to Modern-
Day ERISA Plan Arrangements
The plan fiduciaries in Amschwand argued to the Supreme Court that
make-whole relief was only available where the fiduciary engaged in self-
dealing with the trust or the trust corpus was harmed.   The standard current288
works do not directly contradict this proposition, and since most trust law
cases would have involved either self-dealing or harm to the corpus, it can be
argued that these are “conditions.”  It is almost impossible to refute this
argument by reference to the standard current works, because of the lack of
clarity in those sources as described above, and because of the nature of
traditional trusts.  Unlike the modern ERISA employee welfare benefit plan,
a trust relationship required a trustee, a beneficiary, and a trust corpus.
ERISA, however, does not exactly track all the incidents of traditional trust
law.  Most importantly, ERISA does not require the existence of a trust
corpus for the trust relationship to arise.   Indeed, in the modern context,289
employee welfare benefit plans are either self-funded or insured arrangements
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290. See John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207,
209-11, 223-28 (1990) (explaining, inter alia, why private pension and employee-benefit plans
are trusts, why ERISA trusts differ from private trusts, and drawing a comparison between
ERISA plans and contracts).  Note that Professor Langbein’s article was cited in RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1 Reporter’s Notes cmt. a.
291. See, e.g., ERISA § 501(a)(1)(B).
292. See Amschwand Respondents’ Supp. Brief, supra note 151, at *8.
293. Bosworth v. Allen, 61 N.E. 163, 165, 167 (N.Y. 1901).
294. Id. at 165.
that are contractual in nature.  The contract is to pay premiums in return for
a benefit, such as life insurance or health insurance.  If there is no identifiable
trust res in such an arrangement, how can Amschwand-type plaintiffs ever
show harm to the trust corpus?
The answer is that this group of plaintiffs has to argue by analogy that the
insurance benefit, or other employee welfare benefit, is the trust corpus.290
Once the promised plan benefit is recast as the trust corpus, the argument that
make-whole relief requires harm to the corpus is deflated.  Even if harm to
the trust corpus is required under the traditional make-whole doctrine, the
ERISA trust corpus in the form of the promised benefit is harmed if the
fiduciary’s breach results in the lack of the benefit.
This is not to suggest that the requirement of harm to the corpus is even
dispositive of the right to relief.  The lack of a corpus or harm to a trust
corpus is not required under ERISA’s other remedial provisions such as
section 502(a)(1)(B), and yet participants and beneficiaries are made whole
by an award of the improperly denied benefit.   Further, harm to the trust291
corpus was not required at common law.
2. In Any Event, Make-Whole Relief Was Not Limited to Cases Where
the Trust Corpus Was Harmed
As a general rule, it is certainly true that the majority of cases applying
make-whole relief involved situations where the trustee(s) engaged in self-
dealing or caused loss to the trust corpus by poor investment or otherwise.292
Nevertheless, equity decisions can be found that did not involve harm to the
corpus.  One need look no further than the cases relied upon in Bogert’s
discussion of make-whole relief.
A review of the decisions relied upon by Bogert illustrates that courts
readily acknowledged the appropriateness of make-whole relief for acts of
misconduct that did not involve direct harm to the corpus.  In Bosworth v.
Allen, corporate officers/directors were held liable for improper disposition
of corporate assets.   The court explained that directors are treated as293
trustees in courts of equity and held to a strict “account” for misconduct.294
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300. Id. at 465, *11.
As we have seen, an accounting was one procedural device for holding a
breaching trustee personally liable for payment of monies, such payment
being in the form of a surcharge on the trust account.  In the Bosworth case,
the court explored the nature of fiduciary duties and the broad range of
attendant remedies for breach when trustees are held to account:
Equitable jurisdiction extends to all culpable acts and omissions
of the directors by which the pecuniary interests of the corporation
are or may be injured.  If they are treacherous to its interests, and
appropriate its property, or intentionally waste its assets, or take
money for official action, or “sell out” by resigning, and thus
giving control to others, they are liable to account in equity to the
corporation or its representatives, not only for the money or
property in their hands, but also for such as they fraudulently
disposed of or wasted, as well as for the damages naturally
resulting from their official misconduct; and even, as we have
recently held, for money received by virtue of their office.295
Indeed, the court referred to the accounting action as “flexible
and comprehensive,”  allowing the equity court to order a wide range of296
relief, even if such relief could also be had in a court of law: “While the
cestui que trust may sometimes proceed at law against his trustee, he need not
do so but may always call him into a court of equity.”   The distinguishing297
feature of equity jurisdiction is the need for the equity court’s specialized
expertise on issues such as whether a trust relationship existed and the nature
of the remedy.  Apparently, equity courts saw nothing remarkable about the
proposition that make-whole relief was available in many types of cases,
involving various forms of misconduct, and without any apparent requirement
that the breach must involve self-dealing or harm to the corpus.
Yet other cases relied upon by Bogert expressly awarded make-whole
relief even though there was no harm to the corpus.  In West v. Biscoe, cited
in support of Bogert section 862, the settlor left land to her sons on the
condition that they paid $500 to each of her two granddaughters.   The sons,298
therefore, were trustees of an implied trust in favor of the granddaughters, the
trust fund being the promise to pay $500.   The sons did not pay the $500299
to one of the granddaughters, and her widower sued.   The equity court300
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304. See, e.g., Burris  v. Brooks, 24 S.E.2d 521 (N.C. 1896); Robertson v. Sublett, 25 Tenn.
313 (Tenn. 1845) (finding that the trustee used funds for purposes other than those set forth in
the trust); Silliman v. Gano, 39 S.W. 559, 562 (Tex. 1897) (discussing equitable remedies if the
plaintiffs could establish a trust relationship.  Trustee had sold land and court explained the
applicable general principles: “by the breach of trust [the trustee] becomes, in any event,
personally liable to make compensation to the beneficiary for his property.”). 
305. Id. at 560.
306. Id. at 562-63.
307. Id. at 563.
308. This comports with Professor Medill’s view that make-whole relief is available but not
ordered the sons to pay the $500 and said they were personally liable to pay
the amount directly to the beneficiary.   West v. Biscoe thus demonstrates301
that equity courts would grant remedial relief for breach of fiduciary duty that
did not involve self-dealing or direct loss to any trust corpus, and would order
a direct monetary payment to a beneficiary as opposed to requiring payment
to the trust.  In West, the money owed was a promise to pay a benefit to a
beneficiary, and the money owed was not part of the original trust corpus at
all.   This situation illustrates payment of money owed under a contractarian302
view of trusts—a direct analogue to make-whole relief for breach of a
promise to pay insurance proceeds under section 502(a)(3).  Interestingly, the
equity court also implicitly rejected the defendants’ arguments that any
remedy for personal liability was at law by holding that this was an equitable
claim and that the trustees were under a personal obligation in equity to pay
the money owed.303
In other cases, the “harm” to the trust corpus was that it ceased to exist,
often because it was wrongly given to a third party.   In Silliman v. Gano,304
the trustee had sold various parcels of land that arguably belonged to
plaintiffs in trust.   The court explored the plaintiffs’ potential equitable305
remedies in the event the plaintiffs were able to establish a trust
relationship.   One such remedy, where a trustee has only sold part of the306
property, was that the beneficiary was entitled to “such remedy, if
practicable, as will fully compensate him for his injury, but will not permit
him to elect a remedy which goes beyond a full reparation, merely for the
reason that his trustee has betrayed his confidence.”   In the Amschwand-307
type cases, plaintiffs are similarly deprived of the trust corpus—the insurance
proceeds—through fiduciary breach, and the remedy should similarly fully
compensate them for their injury.  “Full reparation” would consist of the
insurance proceeds that have been lost, but should not extend to other
compensatory damages for emotional distress.308
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309. Appeal of Harrisburg Nat’l Bank, 84 Pa. 380 (1877) (cited in DOL Amschwand Brief,
supra note 3, at **13-14).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 383.
312. Id. at 384.
313. See also BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 146, § 971, at 414-16 (noting that trustee can
be charged in an accounting with the items of trust income that the trustee did not receive but
would have received if he had performed his duties).
314. See Goeres v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., No. C 04-01917 CRB, 2004 WL 2203474,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2004), aff’d, 220 F. App’x 663 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 2994 (2008) (mem.).  
Other illustrative cases can be found.  The facts of another surcharge
action, Appeal of Harrisburg National Bank, are also analogous to the
Amschwand case.   There, the trust corpus consisted of the proceeds of a life309
insurance policy, and the court considered whether the proceeds belonged to
the decedent’s orphans or was payable to the administrator of the estate
(presumably to pay his fees).   The lower court had ordered that the bank310
holding the proceeds should pay these insurance proceeds to the
administrator, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed because the
court had no jurisdiction over the bank or the orphans’ guardian.311
Consequently, the court’s surcharge comments were dicta but are
nevertheless illustrative of the remedial relief available.  The court stated that
if the administrator had not collected the life insurance proceeds or had “lost”
them, he could be surcharged for that amount.312
In such a case, it could be argued that failure to collect proceeds does
indeed harm the trust corpus because the trust corpus is deprived of the
uncollected amount.  But how is that distinguishable from Mr. Amschwand’s
situation?  The answer is that it is not—Mr. Amschwand’s trust consisted of
the life insurance proceeds due to his beneficiary, and that trust was deprived
of the proceeds by a fiduciary breach.  There is no discernable difference
between what happened to Mr. Amschwand and what happened in
Harrisburg National Bank.  Like the administrator in Harrisburg National
Bank, the Spherion fiduciary could be held personally liable for a breach of
trust that resulted in a failure to collect or realize life insurance proceeds.313
This is most analogous to the loss of insurance proceeds in
Amschwand—failure to collect is the same as Spherion’s failure to advise the
participant of his eligibility (or worse, misrepresentation of his eligibility).
Thus, the court stated that an equity court could have surcharged the
administrator with the life insurance proceeds, begging the question why this
case is any different to loss of insurance proceeds by other means, or the loss
of profit caused by a delay in paying Mr. Goeres.   “In the settlement of the314
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320. 194 A. 65 (N.J. 1937).  The relevant facts are set forth in the lower court’s opinion at
Gates v. Plainfield Trust Co., 191 A. 304 (N.J. Ch. 1937). 
321. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).  
322. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 146, § 862.
323. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 206.
administrator’s account, they certainly could decide that this was an asset of
the estate which the administrator ought to have collected, and if he had
negligently lost it, could surcharge him with the amount.”   It is315
disingenuous to argue that this situation is distinguishable from present-day
loss of benefits because it involved harm to the trust corpus.  Moreover, it is
absurd to think that Congress intended to extend trust-law duties to ERISA
fiduciaries and yet limit the remedies available for breach of those duties in
such a fashion. 
English cases support the same point.  In Marriott v. Kinnersley, the trust
corpus included an insurance policy but the trustees discontinued premium
payments.   The trustee was held liable for the proceeds, plus costs.   The316 317
trustee was “charged with a general breach of trust, with the loss sustained by
the discontinuance of the policy, and must pay costs.”   Again, in some318
broad sense there was harm to the corpus in that the life insurance proceeds
were now lost, but such a harm has no meaningful distinction from loss of
insurance proceeds in Amschwand.  Similarly, the failure to pay income to a
beneficiary from a trust fund does not involve “harm to the corpus.”   That319
was the breach at issue in Gates v. Plainfield Trust Co. and yet the
beneficiary was entitled to income from the trust fund, and it was payable
directly to her, not payable back into the fund.320
The only Supreme Court decision that is arguably on point is United States
v. Mitchell.   Proponents of make-whole relief rely on Mitchell, and Bogert321
also cited to the decision in support of the generalized proposition that make-
whole relief is appropriate in a breach of trust case.   Mitchell involved the322
federal government’s liability as trustee over Indian land.   Specifically, the323
Indian beneficiaries alleged that the government: 
(1) failed to obtain a fair market value for timber sold; (2)
failed to manage timber on a sustained-yield basis; (3) failed to
obtain any payment at all for some merchantable timber; (4) failed
to develop a proper system of roads and easements for timber
operations and exacted improper charges from allottees for
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324. Id. at 210.
325. Id. at 225.
326. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) (citing 1 POMEROY, supra note
7, § 181, at 257).
327. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,” supra note 21, at 1350.
328. Id. 
maintenance of roads; (5) failed to pay any interest on certain
funds from timber sales held by the Government and paid
insufficient interest on other funds; and (6) exacted excessive
administrative fees from allottees.324
Make-whole opponents characterize the Mitchell breach as involving harm
or self-dealing with the trust corpus, but the breaches of trust actually alleged
are not so easily characterized as such.  The “corpus” was land and timber on
the land, and the breach of trust was mismanagement of that property.325
Such claims, like the Amschwand-type claims, do not neatly fit into the basic
trust model.  While the corpus (land or timber) was “harmed” in some broad
sense, the mismanagement was more far-reaching and resulted in harm that
cannot be squarely characterized as “harm” to the land or timber, but is more
fairly characterized as consequential loss to the beneficiaries’ interests in the
trust corpus.
The Mertens Court gave Mitchell short shrift, acknowledging that Mitchell
supported the proposition that an equity court could award money damages,
but dismissing Mitchell on the basis that such money damages were in fact
legal, not equitable:
At common law, however, there were many situations—not
limited to those involving enforcement of a trust—in which an
equity court could “establish purely legal rights and grant legal
remedies which would otherwise be beyond the scope of its
authority.”  326
As Professor Langbein notes, the situation that the Mertens Court referred
to was the clean-up doctrine, whereby an equity court could resolve legal
claims and award legal relief if the legal claims were incidental to the
equitable claims.   Neither Mitchell nor the trust law cases discussed above,327
however, were decided under the clean-up doctrine.   The Mitchell case and328
the equity cases addressing make-whole relief were equitable cases brought
against a breaching trustee, not legal claims seeking money damages as an
incident to an otherwise equitable claim.  The Mitchell Court explained that
if a federal statute establishes a trust relationship and its attendant fiduciary
obligations:
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205-12 (1959); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 146, § 862; 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note
84, § 205).  The Court buttressed its decision by reference to the applicable statute and
regulations:
recognition of a damages remedy also furthers the purposes of the statutes and
regulations, which clearly require that the Secretary manage Indian resources so
as to generate proceeds for the Indians. It would be anomalous to conclude that
these enactments create a right to the value of certain resources when the Secretary
lives up to his duties, but no right to the value of the resources if the Secretary’s
duties are not performed. “Absent a retrospective damages remedy, there would
be little to deter federal officials from violating their trust duties, at least until the
allottees managed to obtain a judicial decree against future breaches of trust.”
Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 226-27 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 550 (1980)
(White J., dissenting)).  Justice Scalia, of course, rejects any attempts to adopt a purposive
approach toward ERISA section 502(a)(3).  See Mertens, 506 U.S. at 256.
330. Mertens, 506 U.S. at 248; see also Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable,”
supra note 21, at 1364; Medill, supra note 17.  Professor Langbein has urged the Court to
“confess its error,” and Professor Medill has laid out the path for the Court to follow in
reconciling its precedents with traditional trust law principles, but the Court’s denial of
certiorari in Amschwand likely indicates that the Court is not in a confessional mood. 
[I]t naturally follows that the [fiduciary] should be liable in
damages for the breach of its fiduciary duties.  It is well
established that a trustee is accountable in damages for breaches
of trust. . . . This Court and several other federal courts have
consistently recognized that the existence of a trust relationship
between the United States and an Indian or Indian tribe includes
as a fundamental incident the right of an injured beneficiary to sue
the trustee for damages resulting from a breach of the trust.329
The Mitchell case was not a case where legal claims were incidental to the
equitable claims.  On the contrary, it was an equity case applying a
recognized equitable remedy.  Hence, the clean-up doctrine was not even in
the picture.  Of course, once the clean-up doctrine is taken out of the picture,
Mitchell mandates make-whole relief for ERISA participants and
beneficiaries.  But, that analysis escaped the Court in Mertens and the error
persists.330
3. Make-Whole Relief Was Not Limited to Cases Where the Monetary
Relief Was Payable Back to the Trust
The argument that, to the extent monetary relief was available in equity,
recovery flowed back into the trust is also not supported by the cases.  Again,
in many instances of breach of trust the natural remedy would be to pay
money back into the trust.  Similarly, the surcharge award in an action for an
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335. Graham, 85 Ill. App. at 464 (reversing and remanding dismissal of beneficiary’s claim
against trustee).
336. Moore v. Robertson, 17 N.Y.S. 554 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1891).
337. 24 S.E.2d 521 (N.C. 1896).
338. Id.  Interestingly, many of the cases relied upon by ERISA fiduciary-defendants are
restitution cases, not make-whole cases.  In such cases, the restitutionary relief consists of
restitution of trust funds into the trust.  As we have seen, however, make-whole relief is
distinguishable from restitution.  See, e.g., Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951)
(beneficiaries argued the government trustee should restore to fund monies paid for state taxes);
Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 464 (1939) (involving request for
relief in the form of restoration of lost profits by bad investments)); Amschwand Respondents’
Supp. Brief, supra note 151, at *8 n.3 (citing, inter alia, Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon
accounting would flow back to the trust in the sense that the trustee’s
commission payment from the trust corpus would simply be reduced.  While
it is certainly a truism that the recovery was payable to the trust in most cases,
the cases relied upon by Bogert and others simply do not refer to any rule or
condition that monetary relief must be paid to the trust.
That such a rule was unknown is supported by the existence of cases where
the monetary payment was directly paid to the beneficiary, not to the trust.
In addition to West v. Biscoe,  Appeal of Harrisburg National Bank,  and331 332
Silliman v. Gano, discussed, supra, other cases support this reality.  Again,
one need look no further than Bogert.  For example, in Graham v. Graham,
the beneficiary claimed that the trustee engaged in self-dealing by investing
the trust funds into his own business.   The court held that beneficiaries can333
elect to either follow the fund and claim that in which it has been invested
(tracing the funds) or could elect to hold the trustee personally liable.   The334
money need not be paid into the trust fund—the beneficiary in this case, if he
prevailed on remand, would simply be entitled to receive the amount of the
fund.335
In Moore v. Robertson, trustees were similarly personally charged to
refund money wrongfully diverted from a trust directly to the beneficiaries.336
In Burris  v. Brooks, the North Carolina Supreme Court applied equitable
principles to affirm a ruling that the beneficiary was entitled to “damages”
from a trustee who delivered the trust corpus—a note—to a third party.337
The corpus no longer existed, so naturally the monetary make-whole relief
ran directly to the individual, not back into the trust.   These cases338
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demonstrate that courts of equity apparently saw no problem with allowing
monetary relief to run to the individual beneficiary.  Equitable make-whole
relief under ERISA section 502(a)(3) should not, therefore, be foreclosed on
this basis.
Conclusion
This Article is entitled “a square peg in a round hole” because any attempt
to fit traditional trust law make-whole relief into ERISA section 502(a)(3) as
equitable relief is fraught with difficulties.  The trust world in which make-
whole relief existed is not an exact match for today’s world of employee
welfare benefit plans.  Although Congress anticipated ERISA interpretative
issues would be resolved by resort to traditional trust law principles, it is
unrealistic to expect all the incidents of traditional trust law to apply to a
commercial trust model that does not have the same attributes as the
traditional trust model.  But that is where the Supreme Court has led litigants,
forcing them to squeeze the square peg of make-whole relief into the round
hole of ERISA section 502(a)(3).  Putting aside the Court’s wisdom in
requiring litigants to become experts in the law-equity distinctions of a
bygone era, this Article has attempted to burrow down into the litigation
posture of the Department of Labor in Amschwand-type cases to clarify
whether this form of monetary relief was available and whether any special
conditions attached in equity.
Reference to the standard current works clarifies that make-whole relief
was indeed available as an equitable trust law remedy.  But that is merely a
generalized proposition that begs further inquiry.  The Amschwand fiduciary
defendants took the Supreme Court at its word in Mertens and Great-West
and conducted that inquiry, finding two potential conditions that they believe
equity attached to make-whole relief, limiting its availability.   The special339
conditions that the plan fiduciaries believe foreclose make-whole relief as an
option under section 502(a)(3) are that make-whole relief was only
recognized where the fiduciary breach harmed the trust corpus, and that any
recovery correspondingly went to the trust corpus.340
The first argument, requiring harm to the trust corpus, is attractive from a
defending fiduciary’s perspective because Amschwand-type claims involve
welfare benefit plans which often do not have an identifiable trust corpus.  If
there is no trust corpus, it cannot be harmed.  If there is no harm to the
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341. The breaching fiduciary “shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of
such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary.”
ERISA § 409(a) (emphasis added).
342. Fiduciaries’ Enron Brief, supra note 26. 
343. Id. (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 252 (1993); Great-West Life &
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002)).
344. 413 U.S. 134, 139-44 (1985).
corpus, make-whole relief is unavailable, ergo relief under section 502(a)(3)
is unavailable and the Amschwand-type plaintiffs fall through the hole
entirely.  Because we have seen that make-whole relief was available in cases
where there was no harm to the trust corpus, or where the trust corpus had
ceased to exist, this argument fails even if we accept the proposition that
ERISA welfare benefit plans do not have an identifiable trust corpus.  But, we
need not accept that proposition because the corpus in an ERISA plan is the
promised plan benefit.
The second argument that any make-whole monetary relief must run back
into the trust corpus is belied by ERISA’s remedial scheme.  Certainly, relief
for loss to the plan is payable to the plan under ERISA sections 409 and
502(a)(2).   Relief for these types of cases would, therefore, be payable to341
the trust corpus.  But the availability of relief payable back into the trust
corpus does not foreclose the availability of relief to the individual
beneficiary, as pre-fusion trust law cases evidence, and which is reflected in
ERISA section 502(a)(3).
As explained in Part II.D supra, ERISA section 409(a) specifies the
remedies available against fiduciaries for losses to the plan and is enforceable
in an action brought under section 502(a)(2).  Again, it is important to
remember that section 502(a)(2) only authorizes plan-wide relief.  Thus,
plaintiffs seeking individualized relief for fiduciary breaches are forced to
seek relief under section 502(a)(3).  Plan fiduciaries typically argue that
allowing monetary remedies unavailable under section 409(a) to individuals
as equitable relief under section 502(a)(3) effectively renders section 409(a)
“superfluous”  and in conflict with the Supreme Court’s repeated342
characterization of such relief as “money damages.”343
The first argument is based on Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Russell, where the Supreme Court held that section 409(a) authorizes relief
only for the benefit of the entire plan.   The appropriate enforcement344
provision is section 502(a)(2).  When read together, the liability and
enforcement provisions encapsulate that category of common law cases that
awarded make-whole relief to the trust corpus.  But that still leaves the
category of cases analogous to the modern Amschwand-type category of
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cases, where there was no trust and where the equity court awarded make-
whole relief to the individual beneficiary.  The second category of claims at
common law involved fiduciary breaches that did not result in loss to the trust
corpus, either because the loss was to the beneficiary directly or because the
trust corpus no longer existed.  This is the type of claim that is most
analogous to the Amschwand category of claims.  In such cases, recovery
could not be to the trust, and so the equity courts awarded make-whole relief
to the individual.  Viewing the common law trust and trustee cases through
this prism, therefore, clarifies the distinction between make-whole relief to
the trust—mirrored in sections 409(a) and 502(a)(2)—and make-whole relief
to the individual—mirrored in section 502(a)(3).
This Article illustrates that the Supreme Court has erred in more ways than
one.  As Professor Langbein has argued, the Court’s initial error was to
impose an arcane law-equity distinction on ERISA section 502(a)(3) in the
first place.   Justice Scalia compounded that error in Great-West not only345
by failing to consider make-whole relief at all, but also by declaring that
courts could determine whether a remedy fell within the narrowly-construed
pre-fusion time warp by ready reference to “standard current works.”346
Despite Justice Scalia’s assurances, these works simply do not make the
answer clear.  Because of the lack of clarity, a canny lawyer can read between
the lines and find support for the requirement of special conditions even when
none existed, simply by trolling the cases and finding an absence of an exact
match to the ERISA case being litigated.  But, as illustrated above, one can
also troll the cases and find support for the opposite conclusion.  At the end
of the inquiry, the conclusion is not a stunning one.  The proponents of make-
whole relief appear to have the better of the argument, and should be able to
fit their relief into ERISA section 502(a)(3), but although not a contortion, it
is a tight squeeze.
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